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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In January, 1940, a retired school teacher in Vermont received
a Government check for $22.54— the first monthly Social Security check
ever issued.

In that year, $62 million in benefits were paid to 222,000

persons under the national retirement program which had been established
by Congress five years earlier.

1

From that small trickle, the stream of

payments have increased to a virtual torrent.

Today, 90 percent of the

working population is covered under Social Security; there are more than
30 million recipients of benefits; and the program dispenses $78 billion
annually in benefits.

2

The growth of the program has been especially rapid since 1965.
Benefits have increased fourfold, and taxes to finance them have increased
by more than five times in these twelve years.

The Social Security tax

has become the second largest source of federal revenue, exceeded only
by the individual income tax.

3

Recently, the program has come under considerable attack from
many sides.

Benefit increases over and above those justified by inflation.

^"Will the Social Security Bubble Burst?" Nation's Business,
November 1974, p. 28.
2
Alicia H. Munnel, "The Future of Social Security," New England
Economic Review, July/August 1976, p. 3,
^Ibid.
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changes in the demographic makeup of the nation, and the increasing use
of Social Security funds for need-related benefits are threatening the
financial soundness of the program.

In other respects, the program has

been criticized for failing to respond to changes in life styles and
social attitudes.
The number of persons affected by Social Security and the degree
of this affect, as evidenced by the very size of the Social Security
payroll tax, (in 1977, the maximum combined employee-employer tax was
$1,930) make this a highly controversial topic impinging on many aspects
of the economy.

An indication of the attention Social Security has been

receiving is the 2% inch thick computer printout of pending legislation,
related to the subject, for the 95th Congress.

Bills, addressing all

provisions of the multifaceted system, are listed— ranging from proposals
for slight changes in eligibility requirements or benefits to those which
would completely restructure the system.
The second chapter of this paper will establish historical per
spective for current problems of the system, by tracing the evolution
of Social Security back to the events leading up to the original legis
lation.

From the initial enactment of the law, the development and

sequential legislation of Social Security will be delineated in terms
of solving the problems for which the program was intended, and how this
legislation led to the present system.
Chapter three will discuss recent developments affecting Social
Security and various related issues, that have been the focus of attention
by economists in recent years.

A representative set of proposals to

reform the system will be reviewed and discussed as to their potential
impact on the program and feasibility of their implementation.
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The fourth chapter describes the author's proposal to reform
Social Security.

Supporting arguments for the proposal are based on

equity and efficiency that the reform will facilitate in meeting desired
objectives.

This section will also discuss the implementation of the

reform and analyze the effects of the proposal on income distribution
for different segments of the population.
Primary emphasis of the paper will be on the Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (CAST) portion of the Old-Age, Survivors, Disability
and Health Insurance (OASDHI) program.

Less attention will be given to

the disability and health programs in the system.
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CHAPTER I I

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY

The Social Security Act was signed into law by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 14, 1935.

Enactment of the law and the

intent of its provisions were in response to a changing life style in
the United States and the devastating effects of the Great Depression
on some segments of society.

The United States, in passing the Social

Security Act, followed the example of most developed nations of the
world by enlarging the role of government in providing for the welfare
of its citizens.
The structure of the original Social Security Act was largely
shaped by the history and traditions of the United States.

In its

early history, the United States was a predominantly agricultural
economy-

The family was the basic economic unit and the livelihood of

the family was derived primarily from the soil, producing most of what
it consumed.

Economic hardships of personal misfortunes and old age

were minimized by the closeness of the family unit and community ties.
Because families were large, children could provide for their aging
parents when their parents could no longer work.
The plethora of opportunities offered by an abundance of land
and rich natural resources allowed many people to accumulate wealth
sufficient enough to provide for a lifetime and gave rise to the strong
feelings of self reliance and individualism characteristic of 18th and
4
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19th century America.

The concept of hard work and thrift as means to

provide for future economic needs became an American tradition.
In 1870, more than half of all adult workers were engaged in
farming.

In the years that followed, however, the nation became

increasingly industrialized and, with the development of industry, the
population shifted from farms to the expanding urban areas.

Factory

workers, unlike those engaged in agriculture, were totally dependent on
a continuing flow of money income to obtain the necessities of life for
themselves and their families.

Those that were once self-sufficient

became reliant.
The transformation of an agricultural economy into a mechanized
interdependent society greatly increased the productive capacity of the
nation and brought about an ever-increasing standard of living.

The

changing economic picture, however, created risks to family security
and lessened the ability of families to take care of their own members.
In the event the family breadwinner became ill, disabled (or otherwise
unemployable), or died prematurely, the family lost its sole source of
income.

In an agricultural society, several sources of income were

usually available, and all family members contributed to the economic
well-being of the family unit.
Old age presented a further economic threat.

Few jobs were

available in the factories for older workers when the young were clamor
ing to enter the labor force and could work more efficiently.

Rarely

were families able to save enough from their earnings for a comfortable
retirement.

The industrial age was accompanied by reduction in the size

of families, which meant fewer children to care for their aged parents.
At the same time higher standards of living and advances in medicine were
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adding to the life span of the population, resulting in a large

pro

portion of older people in the makeup of society.
The only remedies available to the poor were private charities
and/or poorhouses, which were notorious for their unfit living condi
tions.

State studies conducted in the first quarter of the 20th century

revealed one-fifth to one-third of the aged were inmates of poorhouses.^
Public disclosure of the inadequacies of such institutions, plus the
increasing magnitude of the problem, motivated some state governments
to adopt various relief and assistance programs for the aged.
Private pensions had been established in the late 1800's by a
few enterprises, primarily railroads, public utilities and large manu
facturing companies.

Retirement programs for certain government employees,

such as teachers, firemen, and policemen developed at about the turn of
the century.

The state of Arizona enacted the first public program,

but it was declared unconstitutional.

Montana was successful in estab

lishing the first state pension plan in 1923, and by 1931, eighteen
states and Alaska had such pension plans.

2

These fragmented efforts

toward a public pension system led the United States along the road that
most European countries had traveled decades earlier.
The development of social insurance in the United States gener
ally lagged behind that of other industrial nations.

In Germany, govern

ment old age insurance was provided in 1889 when Bismarck was Chancellor.

U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Sec
urity Administration, Social Security Financing, by Mary Costello,
Editorial Research Reports, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., (Washington,
D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 714.
^Ibid., pp. 713-14.
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At the start of World War I, in 1914, ten European countries and several
British dominions had public pension plans.

3

Several factors contributed to the slowness of the United States
to take this step.

Labor wages and the United States standard of living

were comparatively higher than those in Europe, which served to perpet
uate the belief that Americans could provide their own security.

Some

large labor unions failed to support the legislation, and the private
insurance industry was opposed to it.
The growth of social insurance legislation in the United States
was also retarded by the relationship of federal and state governments
and the limitations on the federal government in this area as interpreted
by the Supreme Court.^

J. Douglas Brown, an author of the original Social

Security Act, stated that the chief worry of those drafting the legisla
tion was whether the federal government had constitutional authority to
impose such a program on the citizens of the United States.^
The economic collapse of the United States in the Great Depression,
however, brought dramatic attention to the mounting problems of financial
insecurity of the aged and infirm in an urban industrialized society.
Poor people were not the only ones to suffer the ill effects of the
Depression.

Those previously well off saw their savings dissipate through

^Ibid.
^U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social
Security Administration, Social Security Programs in the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 5.
^J. Douglas Brown, An American Philosophy of Social Security:
Evolution and Issues, (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press
1972), p. 10.
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bank failures and depreciated investments and were reduced to either
dependence on their families or relief.^
It has often been said that the Social Security Act was a child
of the Great Depression, during which one-fourth of the workers
of the nation were unemployed and one-fifth of the nation sub
sisted on direct relief or work relief. It is certainly true
that the depression convinced the American people of the necessity
for governmental action to relieve the human distress caused by
unemployment, insecurity in old age and widespread poverty.?
During the 1920*s, two basic schools of thought had emerged with
respect to a national social insurance program.

One group advocated a

system in which employees would contribute to a fund throughout their
working lives.

Abraham Epstein, who in 1927, organized the American

Association for Old-Age Security, was a leading proponent of this form
of social insurance and is credited with the introduction of the term
"social security."

8

Francis E. Townsend, a California physician, organized and led
a second group favoring a government pension financed from the proceeds
of a two percent federal tax on money transactions.

The "Townsend

Movement," which began in 1932, offered a pension of $200 a month for
all persons age 60 or older, the only stipulation being that the amount
be spent in 30 days.

Thus, the plan would not only provide relief for

the aged, but stimulate the economy as well.

9

^Social Security Programs, p. 5.
^Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Security.
(Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press 1966), p. 9.
®Ibid., p. 4.
9
Social Security Financing, p. 714.
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The Democratic convention of 1932 nominated Franklin D. Roosevelt
for president and adopted a platform calling for unemployment and oldage assistance.

Roosevelt, upon being elected, appointed a cabinet-level

Committee on Economic Security charged with developing

. . a compre

hensive social insurance system covering all major personal economic
hazards . . . especially the hazards of unemployment and old age.'*^^
The immediacy of Roosevelt's action to establish a national
social insurance program is said to have been in part to blunt the
appeal of the Townsend Plan, which had developed a large and emotionallycharged following, but was expensive and essentially unworkable.

Also,

however, Roosevelt was a firm believer in government sponsored insurance
programs to prevent economic hardships, as he demonstrated in his early
political career.

As a state senator and later as Governor of New York,

he had been a strong supporter of a workmen's compensation law, the stateenacted old-age pension law and unemployment insurance.

As President,

his timing in introducing the legislation was probably well planned,
aimed at selling the program to the American public before the lessons of
the depression were forgotten.
From the first, the Committee's intent in drafting the legisla
tion was that the plan should be national, compulsory, contributory and
provide benefits as a matter of right.

12

It was considered necessary

that the program be national for the purpose of uniformity and because

^^Altmeyer, Formative Years, p. 13.
l^Ibid., pp. 4-14.

12
Brown, Philosophy of Social Security, p. 10.
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of the great mobility of American workers; contributory, because of the
widely held belief that individuals should be primarily responsible for
their own security and that of their families; compulsory, to prevent
adverse selection and the resulting excessive costs per enrollee; with
payments as a matter of right so that the program would not carry with
it the stigma attached to other public assistance programs or the often
degrading means tests required to prove eligibility under such programs.
The Social Security Act of 1935 incorporated all of these criteria
and was basically a composite program of social Insurance and public
assistance.

The Act created two social insurance programs— (1) a federal

old-age insurance system, now termed the Old-Age, Survivors, Disability,
and Health Insurance (OASDHI), and (2) a federal-state unemployment
insurance system.

The Act also provided for a federal-state public

assistance program for needy persons and federal grants to states for
child welfare, vocational rehabilitation and public health services.

13

Through numerous amendments, the Act has been modified and
expanded in the years following its inception.

Generally, coverage was

broadened, benefits and existing programs were expanded, and new programs
were added.
The original act covered less than 60 percent of the labor force,
while today 90 percent of working Americans are covered under the system.
Expenditures of the system have increased from $62 million in 1940 (the
first year benefits were paid) to an estimated $96.9 billion in 1978.^^

13

"Social Security— Forty Years Later," Social Security Bulletin,
August 1975, p. 1.
^^"Fresh Scare Over Social Security," U.S. News & World Report.
16 February 1976, p. 68.
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Coverage

Initially, only employees in non-agricultural industry and
commerce were eligible for coverage.

Certain types of employment were

originally exempted, including farm and domestic work, self-employment,
work for non-profit organizations or for close relatives, railroad
workers, and government employment— federal, state and local.

Most of

these were brought under the program by amendments to the Act in 1950,
1954, 1956, 1960, and 1965.^^
The remaining workers who are still excluded from coverage can
be classified into three major categories; (1) those covered under the
civil service retirement system and the Railroad Retirement Act; (2)
household workers or farm workers who do not work long enough or earn
enough to meet certain minimum requirements;

16

and (3) persons with very

low net earnings from self employment ($400 or less).
Coverage of state and local government employees has not been
made compulsory because of constitutional restrictions on the federal
government to tax these governmental bodies.

Employees of state and

local governments may be covered under agreements entered into between
the states and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

At

present, about two-thirds of all state and local employees are covered
under these agreements.
Provisions have also been adopted for making coverage available
to employees of certain non-profit organizations, which have traditionally

^^Social Security Financing, p. 716.
16

Fifty dollars per quarter for household workers and $150 a year
(or 20 days working for an employer) for farm workers.
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been tax-exempt.

Most non-profit organizations have elected to waive

their tax-exempt status.
The 1956 legislation extended coverage to the military.

Non

contributory wage credits of $160 a month were provided for military
wages received in kind— i.e., living quarters and meals— for service
during and after World War II up to 1956.

Beginning in 1957, basic pay

of the military service was covered under the regular contributory
provisions of the law.

In addition, service personnel became entitled

to non-contributory wage credits of $300 per quarter for wages received
in kind.
The 1956 additions to the Act also incorporated provisions to
make special payments to individuals reaching age 72 with no coverage
or very limited coverage.

17
Benefits

In addition to the expansion of the Social Security system to
include more groups of workers, benefits disbursed from the system have
been greatly increased since 1935.
Social Security, as it was originally enacted, differs fundamen
tally from the system as it operates today.

The initial legislation

placed emphasis on the principle of '"individual equity"— that workers
should receive out of the system at least as much as they had contrib
uted to it.'

A large reserve fund was thought necessary and was to be

accumulated by deferring benefit payments until 1942.

X8

^^Social Security Programs. p. 25.
18
Joseph A. Pechman, Henry J. Aaron, and Michael K. Taussig,
Social Security— Perspectives for Reform, (Washington, D.C.; The Brook
ings Institution 1968), p. 32.
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The original Act provided only for the payment of monthly cash
benefits to retired workers.

The amount payable was determined by a

worker's lifetime contribution.
The first amendments to the Social Security Act in 1939 marked
a turning point in the historical development of the Act, modifying the
principle of "individual equity" toward the goal of "social adequacy."
In this legislation, benefits were provided for dependents and suirvivors
of covered workers.

The law was also changed to tie benefits to average

earnings over a minimum period of time and to begin benefit payments in
1940 rather than 1942.

These changes were deemed desirable because they

permitted immediate payment to families currently in need.
Legislation in the 1950*s both increased the value of benefits
and broadened the types of benefits in the program.

Benefits overall

were increased with larger increases for those in the lower salary ranges
and benefits for dependents and survivors were raised relative to those
for workers.

These served to reinforce the "social adequacy" goal of the

Social Security system.
In 1956, benefits were added for disabled workers, aged 50-64.
In 1960, the lower age limitation was removed and benefits were added
for the dependents of disabled workers.
The 1956 legislation also included provisions lowering the age
at which women workers were permitted to receive retirement benefits—
from 65 to 62 at an actuarial reduced amount.
to men workers in 1961.

This provision was extended

19

19

The reduction for a worker is 5/9 percent for every month below
age 65 at retirement. Ibid., pp. 32-43.
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A summary of the basic types of benefits under the OASDI
portion of Social Security is as follows;
1.

20

The basic old-age benefit— called the Primary Insurance
Amount (P.I.A.)— is paid to workers retiring at age 65 or
over.

An additional 50 percent of this amount is added

to the benefit if the retired worker is married and the
wife (or dependent husband) or divorced wife
65, or if the worker has a child under 18.

21

22

is over

Reduced

benefits may be elected at age 62.
The formula effective June, 1976, for determining the primary
insurance amount is:

23

137.77% of

first $110

of Average Monthly Wage

50.11% of

next $290

of Average Monthly Wage

46.83% of

next $150

of Average Monthly Wage

55.04% of

next $100

of Average Monthly Wage

30.61% of

next $100

of Average Monthly Wage

25.51% of

next $250

of Average Monthly Wage

22.78% of balance
A worker whose average monthly wage upon retirement, after
excluding the five years of lowest earnings, is $450 will receive
$320.17 in benefits if single with no dependents.

ZOlbid., pp. 41-44.

21
Divorced wives may receive benefits if married 20 or more
years to the covered worker.
22

Children in school, ages 18-22, or disabled before age 22 are
also covered.
23
U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social
Security Administration, Pocket History of Social Security (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 4.
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137.77% of

$110

= $151.55

50.11% of

290

=

145.20

46.83% of

50

=

23.42

Average Monthly Wage

$450

Monthly Benefit

$320.17

If the worker is married and his wife is 65 or older, the
couple's monthly benefit will be $480.25, that is,

Ih

times the primary

insurance amount.
2.

Disability benefits are paid after a waiting period of five
months to workers who are totally disabled.

The disability

benefit is computed in the same way as the retirement bene
fit, but payments tend to be larger, on the average, because
of stricter qualifying requirements for eligibility which
results in the elimination of lower-paid, irregularly
employed workers.

Benefits are also provided for disabled

widows (dependent widowers) and divorced wives.
3.

Survivor benefits are paid to aged widows (dependent
widowers) and divorced w i v e s , c h i l d r e n under 18,^^ and
dependent parents of deceased workers and are based on
the P.I.A.

4.

Lump sum death benefits are paid on the death of an insured
individual.

This payment is three times the monthly primary

insurance amount up to a maximum of $255.

24

Qualifications for divorced wives for disability benefits are
the same as those for dependents of retirees.
25

Qualifications for divorced wives for survivorship benefits
are the same as those for dependents of retirees.

26

Children in school, aged 18-22, or disabled before age 22 are
also covered.
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Eligibility

To qualify for cash benefits a worker must have demonstrated
his attachment to the labor force by a specified amount of time worked
in covered employment.

The period of time a person must have worked in

covered employment is measured in quarters of coverage.

Four categories

of eligibility status exist.
Fully insured status is achieved by having as many quarters of
coverage as there are years between ages 21 and retirement.

For those

that reached age 21 before 1950 the number of quarters required is the
number of years between 1951 and retirement age.

A worker with 40

quarters of coverage is fully insured for life and needs no further
employment to qualify for benefits.

For most types of benefits the

worker must be fully insured.
Transitionally insured status was enacted in 1965 to provide
special minimum benefits to those who had reached age 72 before 1968
with little or no quarters of coverage.

A person reaching age 72 in

1968 or after needs three quarters of coverage for each year after 1966
and up to the year he reaches age 72 to be eligible for special benefits.
In 1966, persons over 72 were made eligible to receive a special minimum
benefit even if they had not attained fully or transitionally insured
status.
Currently insured status is required for survivor benefits to
be paid if a worker dies before fully insured status is achieved.
individual is currently insured if he has acquired six quarters of
coverage within the 13 quarter period preceding his death.
To achieve disability insured status a worker must be fully
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17
Insured and have worked in covered employment for at least 20 quarters in
the period of 40 quarters preceding disablement.

More liberal insured

status requirements apply to workers disabled before age 31 or who are
blind.27
The insured status required for each of the various benefits
paid are listed in Table 1.
Earnings Test
After an individual retires or otherwise obtains eligibility for
Social Security, there is a limit to the amount of money he can earn
through employment and still collect benefits under the program.

In 1977,

a retiree or other person on Social Security can draw wages or salaries up
to $3,000 without any cut in Social Security payments.
ments are reduced $1 for each $2 of wages.

Above $3,000, pay

Benefits are payable, however,

regardless of annual earnings, for any month in which the beneficiary earns
$250 or less in wages and does not render substantial services in selfemployment.

Wages of Social Security beneficiaries over age 72 are not

subject to the earnings test.

The earnings test does not apply to unearned

income such as interest, dividends or royalties.
Medicare
The most significant expansion of the Social Security Act came in
1965 with establishment of the Medicare program, which was " . . .

designed

to close a major gap in the economic security of the elderly by providing
protection against the high cost of hospital and medical care."

27
28

Social Security Programs, pp. 26-30.
"Social Security 40 Years Later," p. 4.
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TABLl 1
CASH BENEFITS PAYABLE AND INSURED STATUS REQUIREMENTS
UNDER OASDHI, JANUARY 1973
Retirement Benetif

If Worker I»;

Monthly payments, equal to the primary insurance amount, are payable tot
A retired worker 6S or over* . . .
Monthly payments, equal to 50 percent
payable to a worker's:

.............

.. . . .

.................

Fully Insured

ofthe primaryinsurance amount arc

Wife or divorced wife 65 or over*..................... ...................... . Fully Insured
Dependent childor grandchild under 18, or 18 through 21 if in school. ........
Fully Insured
Dependent childor grandchild 18 or over who has been disabled since
before 22................... ...................... ......................Fully Insured
Wife of any age if caring for an entitled child under 18 ordisabled.......... Fully
Insured
Dependent husband 65 or over*................................................Fully
Insured
Monthly payments, equal to $58 are payable at age 72 to:
A worker who reached age 65 (62 for women)

before1967

.................... Transitionally
Insured

Monthly payments, equal to $29 are payable at age 72 to s worker's:
Wife who reached age 72 before 1969...........................................Transitionally
Insured
Survivor Benefits

If At Death The Worker la;

Monthly payments, equal to the primary insurance amount,* are
payable to a worker's:
Widow or surviving divorced wife 65or over^ ......................
Dependent widower 65 or over^. . . . . . ............ . . . . . . .

Fully Insured
Fully Insured

Monthly payments, equal to 82.5 percent of the primary insurance
amount, are payable to a worker's:
One dependent parent 62 or over.............................

Fully Insured

Monthly payments, equal to 75 percent of the primary insurance
amount, are payable to a worker's:
Widow or surviving divorced wife under 62 if Caring for an
entitled child under 18 or disabled............................... Fully or currently Insured
Dependent child or grandchild under 18, or 18 through 21 if
in school........................................
Fully or currently Insured
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TABLE 1— Continued
Survivor Benefit»

If At Death The Worker le:

Dependent child or grandchild 18 or over who he# heea
disabled since before 22 ....................................... Fully or Currently Insured
Dependent parent 62 or over, when both parents are entitled. « • • . Fully Insured
Lump-sum payment, equal to the lesser of threetimes the
worker's primary Insurance amount or $255, paid to the
worker's:
Widow or widower, or to pay the burial expense

........

. . .

Fully or Currently Insured

Monthly payments of $58, payable at age 72 to worker's:
Widow who reached 72 before 1969

.........

Transitionally Insured

Disability Benefits

If Worker Is;

Monthly payments, equal to the amounts payable in retirement,^ are
payable to:
A disabled worker under 65 and dependents* . . . . . . . . . .

A blind worker under 65 and dependents ................ •.........
Special Benefits

Fully insured and has 20
quarters of coverage is
the 40 quarters ending with
the quarter he became disabled.
Fully Insured

If The Person Or Couple, Meet:

Monthly payments at age 72 are payable to*
A single person, equal to $58. . . • • • ......... •...........
A couple, equal to $87
.................

Special requirements for inaured status which apply only to
this type of payment.

^Reduced benefits are payable at age 62; benefit amount is permanently reduced by 5/9 of one
percent for each month the benefit is paid before 65. Benefit amount Is increased by 1/12 of one per
cent for each month that no benefits are payable between ages 65 and 72.
^Reduced benefits are payable at age 62; benefit amount is permanently reduced by 25/36 of one
percent for each month the benefit Is paid before 65 (or 25% over the full 3-year period).
^Where a worker was already receiving reduced retirement benefits at time of death, the bene
fit payable to the surviving widow or widower cannot be more than he (she) would be getting if still
alive, except that the benefit amount cannot be reduced to less than 82.5% of the primary insurance
benefit for widow or widower aged 62 or over. Certain remarried widows and widowers receive 50% of
deceased spouse's primary insurance amount.
^Reduced benefits are payable at age 60; benefit amount is permanently reduced by 19/40 of
one percent for each month the benefit Is paid before age 65 (or 28.5% over the full 5-year period).
If disabled, reduced benefits are payable at age 50, ranging from 50% of deceased spouse's primary
insurance amount for entitlement at age 50 up to 71.5% at age 60 (the same amount payable to an
aged widow or widower at that age).
^Except that benefits for a disabled worker before age 65 are not reduced unless he pre
viously received a reduced insurance benefit.
*Same categories as in retirement cases.
SOURCE:

U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Social
Security Programs in the United States. (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973),
pp. 28-29.
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Medicare, as enacted, was comprised of two separate insurance
programs— Part A , hospital coverage for those 65 or older and Part B .
supplementary medical insurance for the aged who elect coverage and
pay the premium.
Medicare differs from other Social Security benefits in that
it provides primarily a service benefit.

Part A coverage applies to

inpatient hospital care, inpatient care in a skilled nursing facility
and home health care.

Almost all of the costs for these services are

paid for up to 60 days in the hospital after a deductible ($104 in 1976)
has been met.

The beneficiary is required to pay a percent of costs

after this time.

Part B coverage applies generally to doctor services

and outpatient hospital care and other health services and supplies not
covered by Medicare hospital Insurance.
also subject to a deductible.

Benefits for these services are

29

The Medicare program was expanded in 1972 to cover medical
expenses for certain individuals under 65, namely;

medical expenses

for disabled workers entitled to Social Security disability or Railroad
Retirement disability benefits, and the treatment of chronic renal
disease for Social Security covered workers and their dependents.

30

Supplemental Security Income

Enactment of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for
the needy aged, blind and disabled in 1974, further contributed to the
welfare (social adequacy) objective of Social Security.

29

SSI evolved

Social Security Programs, p. 48.

30

"Social Security 40 Years Later," p. 4.
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from the section of the original Social Security Act providing federalstate assistance to the poor (See page 10).

Increases in benefits of

that section of the Act paralleled the expansion of benefits under the
social insurance part of the program.

Initially, state-federal programs

were designed to provide money payments to the needy aged, blind, and
dependent children.

The 1950 amendments added disabled adults with

insufficient income to those receiving assistance.

In 1960, a separate

program was added to help the needy aged with medical costs and in 1965
a program to assist all medically indigent, regardless of age, called
medical assistance (Medicaid), was begun.

31

Supplemental Security Income pays monthly checks to people in
financial need who are 65 or older and to people in need at any age if
blind or disabled.

The aim of the program is to provide a basic cash

income— for one person, $167.80 a month, and for a married couple,
$251.80.

These amounts are subject to adjustment if the recipient

receives income of $20 or more in a month from other sources, such as
Social Security, pensions and annuities.

People who work can earn as

much as $65 in a month without any reduction in their Supplemental
Security Income.

The Supplemental Security Income amendment allows

states to add to the federal payment.

In these instances, the payment

is increased.
Recipients of SSI may own no more than $1,500 in assets ($2,250
for a couple) in order to receive benefits.
stocks, jewelry and other valuables.

This includes savings bonds,

Recipients may also own a home if

its value is less than $25,000 and an automobile with a market value of

^^Ibid.
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less than $1,200.

Supplemental Security Income Is financed from general

revenues of the U.S. Treasury.

32

Financing Social Security
Social Security is financed by a payroll tax of a specified
percent levied on employees' earnings up to a maximum taxable wage.
Employee contributions are matched by employer contributions.

Self-

employed individuals are taxed at a rate equal to approximately 1%
times that of the employee rate.

In 1937, the first year in which the

tax was collected, the combined employee-employer payroll tax rate was
2 percent of earnings up to $3,000.

The 1977 employee-employer rate is

11.7 percent on a maximum taxable wage of $16,500 and 7.9 percent for
the self-employed up to the same maximum.

Table 2 shows the history of

increases in the payroll tax rate and the maximum taxable earnings.
Contributions received from taxes are ear-marked for federally
administered trust funds.

Separate trust funds are set up for Old-Age,

Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and Health
Insurance (HI) or Medicare.

Table 2 also shows those portions of the

total payroll tax which are designated for the separate trust funds.
These all combine to comprise OASDHI.
Money placed in the trust funds can be used only to pay benefits
and administrative expenses of the program.

All benefits paid out are

derived from the OASDHI tax or the trust funds with the exception of :

S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social
Security Administration, Supplemental Security Income for the Aged,
Blind and Disabled (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June
1975).
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TABLE 2
EFFECTIVE EARNINGS BASE AND ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION RATE

Contribution Rate (percent)
Employer and Employee Each
Beginning
1937
1950
1951
1954
1955
1957
1959
1960
1962
1963
1966
1967 .
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

Earnings Base

Total

OASI

$ 3,000
3,000
3,600
3,600
4,200
4,200
4,800
4,800
4,800
4,800
6,600
6,600
7,800
7,800
7,800
7,800
9,000
10,800
13,200
14,100
15,300
16,500

1.0
1.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
2.25
2.5
3.0
3.125
3.625
4.2
4.4
4.4
4.8
4.8
5.2
5.2
5.85
5.85
5.85
5.85
5.85

1.0
1.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.25
2.75
2.875
3.375
3.5
3.55
3.325
3.725
3.65
4.05
4.05
4.3
4.375
4.375
4.375
4.375

DI

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.35
0.35
0.475
0.475
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.575
0.575
0.575
0.575

HI

Maximum Contribution

0.35
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9

S 30.00
45.00
54.00
72.00
84.00
94.50
120.00
144.00
150.00
174.00
277.20
290.40
343.20
374.40
374.40
405.60
468.00
631.80
772.20
824.85
895.05
965.25

Self-emnloved
1951
1954
1955
1957
1959
1960
1962
1963
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
SOURCE:

NOTE;

$ 3,600
3,600
4,200
4,200
4,800
4,800
4.800
4,800
6.600
6,600
7,800
7,800
7,800
7,800
9,000
10,800
13,200
14,100
15,300
16,500

2.25
3.0
3.0
3.375
3.750
4.5
4.7
5.4
6.15
6.4
6.4
6.9
6.9
7.5
7.5
8.0
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9

2.25
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.375
4.125
4.325
5.025
5.275
5.375
5.0875
5.5875
5.475
6.075
6.075
6.205
6.185
6.185
6.185
6.185

$

0.375
0.375
0.375
0.375
0.375
0.525
0.525
0.7125
0.7125
0.825
0.825
0.825
0.795
0.815
0.815
0.815
0.815

0.35
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9

81.00
108.00
126.00
141.75
180.00
216.00
225.60
259.20
405.90
422.40
499.20
538.20
538.20
585.00
675.00
864.00
1,042.80
1,113.90
1,208.70
1,303.50

U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration,
Pocket History of Social Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1976), pp. 6-7.
OASI is Old-Age Survivors Insurance, DI is Disability Insurance, and HI is Health
Insurance.
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non-contributory wage credits for service personnel, special aged-72
payments, a portion of Medicare Part B,

33

and SSI benefits.

These are

paid out of U.S. Treasury general revenues.
Surplus funds are invested in interest-bearing U.S. Treasury
securities.

A board of trustees, composed of the Secretary of the

Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Health, Educa
tion and Welfare is responsible for the trust fund and reports period
ically to Congress on its status.
The Social Security system was originally intended to be selfsupporting, and the fund was set up as a reserve fund similar to those
required by private insurance companies.

Beginning with the 1939

amendments, however, as Social Security moved more toward the welfare
oriented goal of "social adequacy," the philosophy as to how the program
should be funded necessarily changed.

Since the 1950's the program has

explicitely operated on a pay-as-you-go basis; i.e., current benefits
to eligible non-workers are paid out of the contributions of current
workers.

These workers— their dependents and survivors— are then supposed

to receive benefits out of contributions of workers at some future date.
In essence, an intergenerational income transfer takes place and an
implicit contract exists between the working population and those receiv
ing benefits, which is continually renewed.

The trust fund functions

basically as a contingency fund to maintain the solvency of the program
in the event of a severe recession.

33

Under Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance, aged persons
who choose to enroll in the program, pay a monthly premium and the
federal government provides a matching amount out of general revenues.
^^Social Security Programs in the United States, p. 4.
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Because of the pay-as-you-go method of financing, the level
of the Social Security tax is set to defray the costs of benefits for
those currently retired.

As benefits have been liberalized and coverage

broadened over the years, taxes have been increased.

This usually

results in a nearly balanced situation in the trust fund for the first
few years, with projections of large surpluses thereafter.

Before the

surpluses are fully realized, however. Congress acts to further increase
benefits, new tax rates are scheduled, and the cycle is repeated.
Overall, the Social Security fund has grown slightly, receiving
payments in excess of benefits and, up to the early 1970's this trend
was projected into the distant future.

35

Through 1956 the OASI trust fund showed a surplus every year as
most of the period was characterized by high employment and inflation.
Alternating small cash deficits and small surpluses occurred between
1957 and 1965 with larger excesses in 1966 and 1967 at which time the
fund was $23 billion.
continued to increase

Between 1967 and 1975 the combined OASDHI fund
to $44.3 billionby the end of 1975.

On February 2,

1976, Secretary of HEW, David Mathews testified

before the House Waysand Means Committee
exceed income by $4.4

37

that outgo of the fund would

billion in 1976. A constant annual deficit of

this amount would deplete the fund in ten years, and many have pre
dicted bankruptcy of Social Security in the near future.

The sudden

decreases in the fund, following years of payments in excess of benefits.

35
Pechman, Aaron and Taussig, Perspectives for Reform, p. 71.
^^Ibid., p. 209.
^^"Fresh Scare," p. 68.
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is often attributed to the length and severity of the recent recession
and is thought to be short term in nature.

38

Actuaries are warning, however, of even more serious long-term
financing problems facing the Social Security system by the turn of the
century.

Two factors threaten the solvency of the fund.

First, the

changing demographic patterns of the nation— most notably the increasing
proportion of older persons in the population— will mean increased num
bers of persons receiving benefits.

The declining birth rate and zero

population growth in the early 1970*s will result in fewer workers to
contribute to the fund.

In 1950 the ratio of working age population

to aged population was 14 to one.

At present this ratio is approximately

7 to one and by the year 2000 the ratio is expected to drop to 3 to
one.

39
The second factor is inflation.

In 1972 Congress amended the

Social Security Act to include an automatic escalator clause to tie
benefits to changes in the Consumer Price Index.

Beginning in 1975,

benefits are automatically increased by the amount of increase in the
CPI any year in which this increase exceeds 3 percent.

The 1972 law

provides for increases in the maximum taxable wage to fund the additional
benefits.

The law provides, in effect, a double adjustment factor for

inflation for future retirees.

Each time retired workers get a cost-of-

living raise in June, the benefit schedule for future retirees also is
raised.

The benefit increases trigger increases in the maximum taxable

^®Ibid.
OQ

"Will the Social Security Bubble Burst?" Nation's Business,
November 1974, pp. 28-30.
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wage, which is the amount used in computing benefits.

Consequently,

some lower-wage workers may some day be retiring on pensions higher
than the highest pay they ever received.

40

Administration of Social Security
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has the overall
responsibility for all aspects of OASDHI.

The Social Security Admin

istration, under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
administers the various programs, except for the collection of taxes
and disbursement of benefits, which are performed by the Department of
the Treasury, and the management and investment of trust funds, which
are done by the Secretary of the Treasury as Managing Trustee.
An advisory council to the Social Security Administration is
appointed every four years and functions to review the status of the
trust funds in relation to the long-term commitments to OASDHI and to
make recommendations with respect to scope of coverage, adequacy of
benefits and all other aspects of the program, including its impact on
public assistance.

Council members include equal representation of

employee and employer organizations, and also represent the selfemployed and the public.

41

^^"Fresh Scare," p. 70.
41

Social Security Programs in the United States, p. 42.
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CHAPTER III

CURRENT ISSUES RELATED TO SOCIAL SECURITY

In this chapter the major problems and criticisms of Social
Security are examined in light of what various economists have written.
The first section introduces the principle issues relevant to Social
Security.

Section two examines proposals for reform from three sources,

which address the different primary areas of concern.

The proposal by

Benjamin Okner focuses principally on providing for progressivity in
the payroll tax and minimizing the payroll tax burdens on the poor.
The proposals by Alicia Munnell in "The Future of Social Security,"
and economists Joseph Pechman, Henry Aaron and Michael Taussig, in "Social
Security— Perspectives for Reform," both advocate an overhaul of the
structure of Social Security.

Ms. Munnell's proposal, with the advan

tage of having been written most recently and after the development of
the Supplemental Security Income program, sees the goal of Social Security
as individual equity.

The authors of "Perspectives for Reform," believ

ing a restructuring of the program, though desirable, was not feasible,
advocated that certain steps be taken to improve the social adequacy of
Social Security.

Principle Issues of Social Security

The most dominant and urgent problem facing the Social Security
system and Congress— and that which has been the foremost subject of

28
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recent literature— is the financial viability of the system.

Many

items of evidence point to serious future problems of funding the
numerous programs that have come under the realm of Social Security
unless major steps are taken to reform and/or to restructure the pre^
sent system.

Short-Term Funding
In 1976, for the first time in the history of Social Security,
a large deficit of disbursements over receipts was predicted.

Deficits

of decreasing amounts were further predicted through 1980, and under
the most realistic of official assumptions of the Social Security Admin
istration, the $6 billion disability insurance trust fund would be
exhausted in three years.

The Old-Age Survivors Insurance Trust Fund,

which currently had assets of $35 billion, was expected to be depleted
sometime in the mid 1980's.^
These short-term deficits are thought to be the result of the
recent recession, as well as benefit increases, enacted by Congress,
designed to compensate Social Security beneficiaries for cost-of-living
increases.

Increased benefits authorized by Congress for the period

1969-1976 actually more than offset increases in the cost of living.
The net real rise in benefits for this period was approximately 15 percent.

2

In addition, during this time period, prices rose more rapidly

than did wages.

Because benefit changes have been tied to the Consumer

^"Farewell to Ponzi? Change Must Come to the Social Security
System," Barron's, 3 January 1977, p. 7.

2
Robert J. Meyers, "How Best to Keep Social Security Solvent,"
Business Horizons, December 1976, p. 45.
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Price Index since the 1972 legislation, benefits increased at a higher
rate than did tax receipts.
The immediate problems of funding are not thought to be irrep
arable.

A slight increase in the Social Security payroll tax rate,

together with minor adjustments in benefits, would serve to stabilize
receipts and disbursements of the fund until the beginning of the next
century.
In 1976, then President Gerald Ford proposed an increase in
the tax rate of three tenths of one percent for 1977, along with two
adjustments to curb benefits.

Under one, the student exception to the

age 18 cut-off of children’s dependent benefits would be phased out
over a four year period.

That is, students, age 18 to 22, would no

longer receive benefits in the event that the family breadwinner retired,
died or became permanently disabled.

3

The second change proposed by Ford would tighten the earnings
limitation rule for Social Security beneficiaries.

The limit on earn

ings a retiree can earn without losing Social Security benefits—
$3,000 a year in 1977— would be applied flatly on an annual basis.
The present rule provides that the Social Security recipient's benefits
will not be decreased for any month in which he does not earn in excess
of the specified limit of $250.

For example, a beneficiary may earn

$20,000 working in the first half of the year, refrain from work in the
last half of the year, and still receive his full monthly benefit in
those six months in which he was idle.

Under Ford's proposal, this

3
"Fresh Scare Over Social Security," U.S. News & World Report,
16 February 1976, pp. 68-69.
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beneficiary would receive no Social Security benefits for the entire
year because the earnings limit of $3,000 per year had been exceeded.
Officials estimated that these two benefit changes would yield
cost reductions of up to $1.8 billion a year and, together with the
tax increase, would turn the operating deficit to a surplus the year
following implementation.^

Long-Term Funding
Although not as immediate, the long-term solvency of Social
Security is thought to be considerably more perplexing and serious in
nature.

In the U.S. Treasury publication, "The Statement of Liabilities

and Other Financial Commitments of the U.S. Government," issued in
January, 1977, the Social Security system reflected unfunded liabil
ities of between $2.7 and $4.1 trillion.^
Other official 1976 projections from the Office of the Actuary,
Social Security Administration, estimate that the combined employeeemployer cost for the Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
portion of Social Security must increase from the current 10.6 percent
of taxable payroll to 28.6 percent of taxable payroll in the year 2050
if the current benefit structure is retained.

The present OASDI tax

rate, excluding Medicare, is 9.9 percent but, as of 1975, this rate has
not covered the full costs of benefits.^

4

Ibid.

^"Farewell to Ponzi?" p. 7,
^Alicia H. Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," New England
Economic Review, July/August 1976, p. 11.
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Because of the span of time covered in such forecasts issued by
the Social Security Actuary (75 years as required by law), these predic
tions are subject to considerable amount of uncertainty.

A slight var

iation in a factor, such as expected birth rate, can have enormous effects
on assumptions as to the size and age of composition of the future popula
tion, and hence on the future benefit costs of the program.
Alicia H. Munnell, Assistant Vice President and Economist for
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, attributes these projected cost
increases to two equally important factors.

The changing demographic

structure of the population is responsible for one-half of the pro
jected increase.

Because Social Security is financed on a pay-as-you-

go system, costs of the program are highly dependent on the ratio of
retirees receiving benefits to the number of workers paying into the
program at any given time.

The anticipated increase in this ratio,

due to the declining birth rate and increased life expectancy, implies
an inevitable matching increase in costs.
beneficiaries for every 100 workers.

There are now (1976) 30

In the year 2050, with a Bureau

of Census projected fertility rate of 1.9 children per woman, there
would be 51 Social Security beneficiaries for every 100 workers.

This

70 percent increase in the relative number of beneficiaries to workers
will require a 70 percent increase in the OASDI tax rate if benefit
replacement rates are to be maintained.^
The other half of the projected increase is the result of the
unintended double adjustment in benefits for future retirees as provided
by the automatic escalator clause in the 1972 Social Security legislation.
(See page 26, Chapter II.)

^Ibid., p. 8.
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Numerous and varied proposals have been advanced to ensure the
future adequacy of the program.

Most authorities seem to agree on one

partial remedy— that the technical error in the current benefit compu
tation formula should be corrected as soon as possible to eliminate the
double adjustment of inflation for future retirees.

The corrective

method supported by many economists is referred to as "decoupling" and
would, in effect, provide only a single adjustment for inflation which
would stabilize wage replacement ratios (the ratio of benefits immedi
ately after retirement to earnings immediately preceding retirement).
The current "coupled" method for making cost of living adjust
ments, changes the factors in the Social Security benefit formula by
the amount of change in the Consumer Price Index.

For example, in

June, 1976, the benefit formula in effect at that time, was automatic
ally changed to reflect an increase in the CPI of 6.4 percent the pre
vious year.
Before the cost of living adjustment, the first factor of the
benefit formula was "129.48 percent of the first $110 of the average
monthly wage."
first $110 AMW.

This became 137.77 percent (or 129.48 x 1.064) of the
The second factor "47.10 percent of the next $290"

became 50.11 percent (or 47.10 x 1.064) of the next $290, and so forth
through the entire formula, resulting in the present benefit formula.
(See page 14, Chapter II.)

This adjustment procedure works well for

those beneficiaries already retired, serving to maintain the purchasing
power of their benefits at their original level.
However, future retirees still in the labor force get, in effect,
two adjustments for inflation.

The first in the form of higher average

monthly wages because, generally, workers receive wage increases to
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compensate for inflation, and the second in the inflation adjusted
g
formula used to compute their benefits when they retire.
Under "decoupling," benefit increases would be given for current
retirees just as at present.

However, benefits for new and future retir

ees would be calculated using wage-indexed earnings rather than past
actual earnings.

Decoupling would have little impact in the first few

years, but would have increasing results in the future, eliminating
about half of the long-term deficit.

9

Possible solutions to the remaining half of the problem are
much more controversial and involve analysis of the fundamental intent
of Social Security, individual equity as opposed to social adequacy,
and the appropriate scope of the system for the future.
Short-term adjustments, such as a slight increase in the tax
rate, and/or decreases in benefits would eliminate a portion of the
future deficit and would probably be politically feasible, however, the
large increase in the payroll tax rate necessary to fund the program in
the next century would quite probably erode the support of the American
public.

Even under decoupling, the tax rate required to finance benefits

for the year 2050 is projected at 19.2 p e r c e n t . T h e impact that in
creasing the tax rate would have on low- and middle-income workers also
makes this alternative less than desirable.
An additional alternative to fill the financing gap, given the
current structure of the system, is to raise the maximum amount of

^Ibid., pp. 8-9.
g
Meyers, "How Best to Keep Social Security Solvent," p. 50.
^^Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," p. 15.
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earnings subject to the tax.

This plan is favored by labor unions as

it would reduce regressivity and can be justified in historical per
spective,

When Social Security began, 97 percent of covered workers had

all of their wages taxed.
all of their wages taxed.

Today only 85 percent of covered workers have
11

Arguments in opposition to this alternative cite the already
precipitous rise in the maximum by 112 percent (from $7,800 to $16,500)
in the past six years.

Moreover, the maximum taxable wages will continue

to rise without further legislation in line with average wage increases
as part of the automatic excalator clause.

Also, any boosts in the wage

base trigger higher future benefits for those who are affected by the
higher taxable maximum.

This alternative would increase revenue in the

short run, but long-term revenue increases would be offset by higher
benefits.
Social Security is often criticized for diverting funds from
the private sector, which would otherwise be saved or invested, contrib
uting to a capital shortage.

(This subject will be further developed

in a later section of the chapter.)

Increasing the maximum taxable wage

would affect only those in the higher income brackets that have money to
invest; consequently, capital accumulation could be affected adversely.
A third option to alleviate the funding shortage would be to
supplement the payroll tax with some method of general revenue financing.
This idea is thought desirable because it partially substitutes progressive income and corporate taxes for the regressive payroll tax.

12

^^"Propping Up Social Security," Business Week, 19 July 1976,
p. 36.

12

Ibid. Two proposals requiring general revenue financing, which
have the objective of providing payroll tax relief to low-income workers,
will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Critics of general revenue financing— including the past Ford
Administration— feel that such a fundamental change in the program
would have a detrimental psychological effect, eroding the "earnedright" nature of Social Security.
revenues results

Moreover, financing from general

. . in the loss of the fiscal discipline that the

need to rely on earmarked taxes imposes on Congress's generosity."

13

Finally, the projected cost increase for the Social Security
program may necessitate a reduction of benefits, although Congress, in
the past, has been reluctant to take such steps.
One method of reducing benefits Is to reduce the wage-replacement
ratio.

Current replacement ratios, for single workers retiring at age

65, range between 62 percent for someone who earned $3,400 a year to 31
percent for someone earning $14,100.

This could be accomplished by

devising a benefit formula which allowed the ratio of benefits to pre
retirement earnings to decline gradually; or, alternatively, by simply
maintaining the real purchasing power of today's benefits.

Constant

real benefits, combined with rising real wages due to productivity gains,
would result in declining replacement rates and hence would serve to
lower costs of the program.
Funding of the various Social Security programs is not the sole
problem to be dealt with in the future.

The program has been the sub

ject of criticism In many areas especially those relating to administra
tion of the tax and the numerous and diverse benefit provisions.

The

changes involved in remedying these problems and satisfying the different

^^Ibid., p. 37.
^^Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," p. 16.
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interest groups under Social Security usually require additional revenue
for the system— something which is in short supply at present.

Conse

quently, many recognized problem areas have not been acted on by Congress.
Some of the more predominant and controversial issues will be discussed
here.

Regressivity
An issue which has received considerable attention from econ
omists and social critics is that of the impact of the Social Security
tax on the poor.

Approximately half of all working Americans pay out

more in the Social Security tax than in personal income taxes.

In 1975,

15 million of these Americans were too poor to pay any income tax at
all.

15

Milton Friedman calls the Social Security tax "the most regres

sive tax in our tax system."

A worker earning $5,000 a year pays 5.85

percent of his income in Social Security tax, while a person earning
$50,000 pays less than 2 percent of his salary.
Defenders of the payroll tax method of financing Social Security
argue that the regressive tax structure is offset by steeply progressive
benefits, which give low-income workers bigger returns on their contri
butions than higher-income workers.
of a worker, equity is achieved.

Thus, it is argued, over the life

However, studies have indicated that

other factors cause the poor to fare less well under Social Security.
The poor tend to enter the labor market at an earlier age, so have pay
roll taxes deducted for a longer period of time.

Also, the poor die

^^"Propping Social Security," p. 38.

^^Ibid.
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17

at an earlier age, so receive benefits for a shorter period of time.

Earnings Test
One of the most emotional issues of Social Security is the
retirement earnings test, which penalizes retirees who earn more than
$3,000 a year (the limit on exempt earnings is raised each year in
line with average wages) or engage in "substantial services" in self
employment.

The test applies to retirees under age 72 and reduces

benefits $1 for every $2 earned.

Many believe the test is inequitable

because it excludes unearned income such as dividends and Interest and
thus favors the well-to-do over the poor.

It is also thought that the

earnings test weakens work incentives of the aged.

18

Supporters of the earnings test contend that the test is neces
sary to be consistent with Social Security goals (income support and
earnings maintenance after retirement).

The payment of benefits, in

addition to earnings, is not to maintain past income levels, but rather
to add to existing incomes, which frequently are more than adequate.

19

The Social Security Administration estimated that elimination of the
retirement earnings test would cost the program $6 billion a year and
would affect only 10 percent of retirees.

20

Ibid. The problem of regressivity in Social Security is
addressed in a proposal for reform by Benjamin Okner, which is discus
sed in the second section of this chapter.
18
19

"Propping Social Security," p. 43.
Pechman, Aaron and Taussig, Perspectives for Reform, p. 147.

20
"Propping Social Security," p. 43.
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Dependency Test for Husbands
A recent Supreme Court decision will eliminate an inequity
existing since dependent benefits were first introduced.

At that time

(1939), the prevailing attitude stereotyped the husband as the principle
breadwinner for the family and the wife as dependent upon his income for
support.

A wife's contribution to the family income was considered

minimal.

Consequently, benefits were formulated on this basis and the

treatment of husbands and wives differed in determining eligibility for
Social Security benefits.

A husband is required to prove dependency in

order to collect benefits on his wife's earnings record, but the opposite
is not true.

In the same way, widows and widowers of workers are treated

differently, with a widower required to prove dependency on his wife's
income.

Divorced women, who were married a minimum of 20 years, may

collect benefits on their ex-husband's Social Security record but div
orced men do not have the same privilege whether able to prove dependency
or not.

21
On March 2, 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that differences

in the treatment of widows and widowers under Social Security is uncon
stitutional.

This decision will probably be interpreted to mean that

it is also unconstitutional to treat wives better than husbands in decid
ing eligibility for Social Security pensions.

The added benefits to

widowers are expected to cost $447 million a year.

22

^^Ibid.
22

"Court Strikes Sex Discrimination from Social Security,"
Great Falls Tribune, 3 March 1977, p. 1.
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Women and Social Security
Social Security is frequently criticized as discriminating
against women workers.

Two basic reasons give grounds for this com

plaint:

(1)

women workers generally receive lower benefits than men,

and (2)

the contributions of women workers generate less in benefits

for their family members than do those of men.

This second point is

the result of different eligibility provisions of the Act applicable
to men and women as discussed above.
The first point listed is somewhat more obscure.
do receive less in benefits than men.

Women workers

In July, 1975, the average Social

Security benefit for retired women workers was $180 as compared to an
average of $225 for retired male workers.

The reason for this is that

a disproportionate number of women work in low-paying and/or part-time
jobs even when they are the principle breadwinner for the family.

In

addition, women's careers in employment outside of the home are fre
quently interrupted to have and raise children.

Because benefits are

based on average monthly wages earned between age 22 and retirement
(minus the 5 years of lowest earnings), the earnings histories of women
workers often have large gaps in years where little or no wages were
paid in covered employment.

Yet these years with zero wages, to the

extent that there are more than five, are included in averaging earnings
to compute benefits.

23

23
U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Aging, Women and
Social Security: Adapting to a New Era, prepared by the Task Force on
Women and Social Security, 94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.;
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 19-34.
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Wives of deceased workers with large families often choose to
stay at home to raise children and collect benefits payable to widows
with dependent children.

These benefits are removed, however, when

children reach age 18 or 22, if they are students.

The former homemaker

is then required to find employment outside of the home, and is often
forced to accept low-paying jobs because of her age and lack of employ
able skills when entering the labor market.
Due to the frequent interruption of careers in covered employ
ment, women are also less likely to qualify for disability benefits,
because this requires disability insured status, e.g., 20 quarters of
coverage during the 40 quarter period preceding disablement.
The provisions of the Act (other than those relating to eligi
bility) do not specifically discriminate as to sex.

In the beginning.

Social Security was primarily oriented toward individual equity, and
it was considered necessary that workers prove their attachment to the
labor force in order to receive benefits— hence the provisions for
computing average monthly wage and eligibility for disability require
ments.

The provisions have major impact on women because of prevail

ing social and economic employment habits.

Some provisions, such as

the progressive benefit formula and the minimum benefit, are designed
to help those with low wages and substantial periods of unemployment.
The average benefit paid to retired women represents a higher proportion
of her past earnings than does the average benefit of retired men.

24

A final criticism of Social Security, with respect to the treat
ment of women, is the failure of the system to assign any economic value

^^Ibid.
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to the role of homemaker.

Women, who remain out of the labor force to

care for children and manage the household, contribute to the economic
welfare of the family but do not receive credit for this under Social
Security.

Consequently, the homemaker must depend on her spouse’s

earnings record for Social Security benefits, which may be very meager,
or none, if she is divorced before 20 years of marriage.
A bill introduced in Congress in February, 1977, by Representa
tive Donald Fraser of Minnesota, addresses this problem.

The bill would

provide an option available to all married couples by which the homemaker
would share 50-50 in Social Security credits based on the spouse’s
covered earnings.

25

Social Security and Capital Accumulation
Martin Feldstein, professor of economics at Harvard University,
has criticized Social Security, because he believes, as many economists
do, that it depresses private savings and thus Inhibits capital accumulation and investment necessary for satisfactory economic growth.

26

An econometric study, which Mr. Feldstein conducted of U.S.
savings behavior since 1929, indicated that Social Security does sub
stantially lower private saving.

His statistical estimates indicate

that Social Security reduces private saving by about 35 percent.

In

essence, current workers have decided to save less because they expect
to receive Social Security pensions.

Also, because of the pay-as-you-

go method of financing the program, there is very little public saving

25
U.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Provide Equity in Social
Security for Individuals and Families, H.R. 3247, 95th Cong., 1st sess.,
1977.
26

"Propping Social Security," p. 38.
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to offset this drop in private saving.

The 35 percent reduction in

private savings implies that, in the long run, capital stock will be
35 percent smaller than it otherwise would be.

27

Mr. Feldstein recommends the accumulation of a larger Social
Security trust fund by means of a 2-4 percent rise in the tax rate.
In conjunction with this, the rate at which benefits are now allowed
to increase must be restricted.

He estimates a 2 percent rise in the

tax rate would produce a surplus in the fund of $15 billion a year,
which could be used to buy government debt.

The increased capital

formation would result in higher production and lower unemployment,
and eventually reduce the system's need for tax revenues.

28

Proposals for Reform

Benjamin A- Okner
Mr. Okner's proposals primarily address the goals of providing
payroll tax relief for the poor through the alteration of the proportional Social Security tax to make it progressive.

29

(The statistics

used in all three proposals to be discussed are based on 1975 tax,
earnings and population data.)
Reform within existing payroll tax structure
Okner's first proposal calls for the introduction into the pay
roll tax of a $1,300 standard deduction plus a $750 exemption for each

27
Martin Feldstein, "Social Security, Tax Reform and Capital
Accumulation," Tax Review, February 1976, pp. 5-8.
^®Ibid.
29

The following material is taken from Benjamin A. Okner, The
Social Security Payroll Tax: Some Alternatives for Reform," The Journal
of Finance, 30 (May 1975): 567-578.
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dependent as In the personal income tax.

These need not be the same as

those used in income tax computation and lower exemptions would decrease
the amount of revenue loss; however, lower exemptions would also dec
rease progressivity.

If lower exemptions are used, Okner suggests this

feature be combined with a progressive rate structure.
Under any one of these options, exemptions may or may not be
phased out at higher income levels, i.e., reduction of the exemption
of $1 for every $2 that income is above the exemption level.

Phasing

out the exemption as income rises produces a "hump" in marginal tax
rates, i.e., in a family of four, using a standard deduction of $1,300
and a $750 exemption per dependent, the marginal tax rate on earnings
below $4,300 is zero; 8.775 percent on earnings from $4,300 to $12,900
5.85 percent on earnings from $12,900 to the ceiling, and zero on earn
ings from the ceiling up.

The alternative is to have the full exemption

granted to all taxpayers.

If this were done, the "hump" would be elimin

ated but at a greater revenue loss.
Okner estimated that implementation of these plans in 1975
would have decreased Social Security payroll tax revenue by $5 billion,
with the exemption phaseout, compared to $14 billion without the phase
out.

Two methods were suggested for recouping this lost revenue through

the existing payroll tax— increasing the tax rate and increasing or
eliminating the maximum on taxable wages.

Increasing the tax rate alone

was rejected because of its eventual regressivity.

The maximum taxable

wage would need to be increased to $19,700 to finance this plan with the
phased-out exemption.

Even by eliminating the maximum, however, enough

revenue could not be generated to finance the plan with the full exemp
tion granted to all.
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By comparing the consequences of using various tax rates and
various maximum taxable wages, the author determined the greatest
amount of tax relief to the poor would be given by Increasing the tax
rate by 0.77 percentage points and eliminating the taxable maximum.
Under these hypothetical changes, allowing a standard deduction of
$1,300 and a $750 exemption per dependent, the average payroll tax as
a percent of income would drop 87 percent for those with income below
$3,000 and 41 percent for those in the $3,000 - $5,000 range.
Partial integration of payroll and income taxes
Okner's second proposal involves the same method of levying the
tax— using a standard deduction and exemptions— but financing the addi
tional costs through transfers from U.S. Treasury general revenues.

An

estimated 3.5 percent surtax on the personal income tax would finance
the phased-out exemption reform package.

A 9.7 percent surtax would be

required without the exemption phaseout.
The average taxes paid by low- and middle-income workers don't
differ greatly between the two methods of financing, and are reduced
under both methods for those with incomes under $20,000.

Average taxes,

under both methods of financing, are significantly increased for those
with incomes of $50,000 or more.

Comparing the two methods, the author

favors the use of general revenues to finance the added cost of intro
ducing exemptions into the payroll tax.
Advantages of partially integrating the two taxes in this manner
to reduce payroll tax regressivity would be to (1)

illustrate the need

to consider the combined income and payroll tax burdens of taxpayers and
(2) establish a precedent for the future full integration of the two taxes.
Okner's final proposal illustrates this alternative.
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Full Integration of payroll and Income taxes
The full integration proposal involves the redistribution of
income and payroll tax burdens in the interests of providing tax relief
to the poor.
The implementation procedure suggested is relatively simple.
The Social Security maximum taxable earnings, tax rate, and benefit
computation formula would stay the same.

However, the payroll taxes

withheld from the employee's earnings during the year would be credited
against the employee's personal income tax and any excess refunded.
The proposal would result in an 80 percent drop in total taxes
for those having income of $3,000 or less, the same or lower tax liabil
ities for those earning less than $25,000.

Tax liabilities for those in

the highest income class ($1 million and over) would increase 30 percent.
The author argues that the totally integrated income and payroll
tax system is the best way to increase progressivity and provide tax
relief to the poor; however, such a radical departure from the existing
structure may not be acceptable to the American public.

The primary

objection would be the drastic increases in tax rates required.

Esti

mates of rate increases from 45 percent to 65 percent have been projec
ted.

Total individual income taxes would have to rise 30 percent to con

solidate the two taxes.

Such an increase, according to the author, implies

increases in marginal tax rates to as much as 92 percent which may serve
to reduce work and investment incentives.

Alicia H. Munnell
A proposal by Alicia Munnell involves a redefining of the role of
Social Security, a reduction in the wage replacement ratios and an increase
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in the retirement age, which together would reduce the long-term financial requirements of the program.

30

Ms Munnell suggests that two recent developments should delineate
the scope of Social Security in the future— the enactment of the Supple
mental Security Income (SSI) program in 1972 and the Employees Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974Since its inception. Social Security has been assigned two, not
necessarily complementary, roles— that of (1) providing a wage-related
retirement earnings replacement program (individual equity) and (2)
income support for the needy, aged and disabled, and their dependents
(social adequacy).

The program has increasingly leaned more toward the

latter role through such additions as minimum benefits, dependent's
benefits, and a steeply progressive benefit formula.
Prior to 1974, further assistance to the needy, aged, disabled
and blind was provided through state administered, federally subsidized
welfare programs.

Because these programs were largely independent of

the federal government, benefit levels and eligibility requirements
varied widely among states and did not appear to lessen the social ade
quacy roles of Social Security.
The Supplemental Security Income program replaced the network
of state systems with a uniform federally administered welfare program.
In addition. Supplemental Security Income, by furnishing need-related
benefits to the low-income elderly, preempted the social adequacy function
of Social Security.

Munnell argues, that since SSI provides a floor

30

The following material is taken from Alicia H. Munnell, "The
Future of Social Security," pp. 3-28.
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beneath which no elderly persons' income can fall, the rationale for
having welfare programs in Social Security is weakened; therefore.
Social Security benefits can be restructured along less progressive
lines.
Evidence that
the same role for the

Social Security and SSI are attempting to fulfill
same population is apparent

from the fact that 70

percent of aged SSI recipients also receive Social Security payments.
However, SSI is thought to be more efficient in this role because the
means test ensures that benefits go only to those with a demonstrable
need.
under

Munnell concluded that all welfare provisions for the elderly
Social Security should be transferred to an expanded SSI program.
In the same way that the existence of SSI precludes welfare-

related benefits at low-income levels, recent growth and strengthening
of private pension systems indicates that benefits at higher-income levels
should also be limited.

In 1974, about 30 million workers were covered

under private employer-financed retirement programs.

Coverage under

private plans had doubled from 22.5 percent of the labor force to 44.0
percent between 1950 and 1974.

Private pension contributions in 1974

equaled approximately half of the $48 billion payroll tax paid into the
OASI trust fund in that year.

Six million retirees and survivors were

receiving benefits from private pensions in 1974, as compared to 19 mil
lion receiving old-age survivors benefits under Social Security.
Congressional investigations in the 1960's and 1970's revealed,
however, that many private plans were underfunded, or mismanaged, or had
such stringent vesting requirements as to be of no value to many employees.
ERISA, as enacted in 1974, set up minimum vesting and protability stan
dards for private pension plans.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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was created, which is empowered to pay up to $750 to a retiree whose
pension plan fails to meet its obligation.

The Act also introduced

individual retirement accounts (IRA) for workers not covered by a com
pany or union plan.

Under this provision, workers may set aside up to

15 percent of their annual income (or $1,500, whichever is less) for
retirement.

Contributions and interest received from the account are

tax exempt until retirement.

Self-employed Individuals may deduct up

to $7,500 a year towards retirement.
Availability of private pension plans and IRA programs primarily
affect middle and upper-income workers, and provide a way for them to
supplement Social Security benefits.

Munnell believes, therefore, that

additional Social Security benefits for these income groups are unneces
sary, undesirable, and would interfere with private initiative to save.
As a result of these developments. Social Security can occupy
a unique role in the three-tiered retirement system— grounded at the
bottom by SSI and at the top by the funded private pensions and indivi
dual savings.

Munnell's suggestion for reform would retain the payroll

tax as the means for financing Social Security, restructure the benefit
formula to provide benefits proportional to wages, and eliminate welfareoriented provisions, returning the entire program to a wage-related re
tirement system.

Benefit Formula
Under the present Social Security benefit formula, low-wage
workers receive benefits, which are a higher proportion of their pre
retirement earnings than those with higher income.

This is the case

regardless of whether their low average wage is due to low wage rates
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or short periods of time spent in covered employment, i.e., government
employees after retirement may work the minimum amount of time in covered
industry employment— 40 quarters or 10 years— and qualify to receive
Social Security benefits in addition to their civil service pension.
The result is that progressive benefits often serve to augment the
income of elderly persons, who are comparatively well-off because of
unearned income or additional pension, and many individuals, who would
otherwise be ineligible for welfare, receive benefits designed for the
needy.

For these reasons. Social Security is believed to be an ineffic

ient vehicle in the role of providing social adequacy.
Instead, Munnell proposed that the present benefit formula
should be reworked to make benefits proportional to contributions for
all retirees.

Supplementary benefits would be provided for low-income

workers through SSI.

In this way, the two goals of retirement earnings

replacement and income maintenance would be in two completely separate
programs.
The earnings replacement function would be performed by Social
Security with wage replacement ratios equal across all earnings levels.
A possible replacement rate suggested was 40 percent of preretirement
earnings.

Elimination of the minimum benefit
In 1939, the minimun Social Security benefit was introduced to
provide a base under which no worker's benefit could fall.

Over time,

in response to criticism that it was inadequate to meet basic needs, it
has been increased twice as fast as average benefits.

SSI, however, has

eliminated the need for this benefit and Munnell feels it should be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51
phased out.

The minimum benefit is not consistent with a wage-related

benefit structure.

Moreover, it is believed that many of those receiv

ing the benefit are individuals who spent only a short period of their
working lives in covered employment and are not primarily dependent upon
Social Security in retirement (i.e., civil service retirees, as discus
sed above).

Working women and dependent benefits
Married couples, in which both the husband and the wife are
employed outside the home, now comprise the majority of families.

In

1974, a study of families in the United States in which the husband was
between 25 and 65, indicated that in 51 percent of the families, both
husband and wife worked in covered employment.

By 1970, 68 percent of

women 45-49 years of age had enough quarters of coverage to qualify for
their own primary benefit under Social Security.

It is predicted, in

the year 2020, that 70 percent of aged wives of retired worker benefi
ciaries will be entitled to benefits on their own earnings record.
Increased participation of women in the labor force raises the
possibility of phasing out dependent benefits for spouses.

Dependent

benefits are the source of many inequities in Social Security.

The most

apparent inequity is the treatment of a single retired worker as compared
to a married retired worker.

Although two workers are the same age with

identical wage histories and retirement dates, the married worker will
receive 1% times the single worker’s benefit.
A more serious inequity exists in the two-earner couple, where
the wife contributes to Social Security through the payroll tax, but
received a dependent benefit based on her husband's earnings (if it is
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greater than the benefit she would receive from her own earnings record).
In this way, a two-earner couple can contribute the same amount to Social
Security as an identical couple, in which only the husband works, and
receive less in benefits.
Such inequities are not consistent with the wage-related retire
ment program as formulated.

However, some provision must be made for

retirement income of aged women who do not participate in the labor
force if these benefits are to be phased out.

A possible solution is

the mandatory division of a married couple's contribution credits.

In

this way, a wife would have an earnings record of her own on which to
receive benefits.

Another postulated solution is to have married workers

contribute 150 percent of the tax of a single worker in order to receive
an additional 50 percent benefit for a nonworking

spouse.

Extending the retirement age
Another issue addressed in the proposal and a possible way to
reduce Social Security costs is by gradually introducing a later age
at which retirement benefits will be payable.

Munnell suggests a new

retirement age of 68 and cites the following statistics as rationale for
this change:

The average life expectancy at age 65 increased 25 percent

between 1930 and 1970, rising from 12.2 to 15.2 years.

Also, between

1958 and 1974 the number of days of restricted activity for persons aged
65 and over declined from 47.3 to 38.0 days.

By phasing in a retirement

age of 68 between the years 2005 and 2023, the combined Social Security
tax rate could be reduced 1.5 percentage points by 2050.
Prevailing social and economic
lowering the retirement age because of

forces are now directed toward
a growing work

force.However,

in 2005, the workforce will be smaller— because of the current zero
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population growth— and the number of retirees greater, so phasing in a
lower retirement age would be desirable.
The payroll tax
A recurrent criticism of Social Security, as noted earlier, is
the regressivity of the payroll tax.

Low-income workers pay a higher

proportion of their total income because (1)
earned income and (2)
taxation.

the tax is levied only on

wages above the maximum taxable are exempt from

Munnell argues, however, that the regressivity of the payroll

tax is partially offset by the earned income credit, a feature intro
duced into the personal income tax by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
The earned income credit is available to low-income workers who have
dependent children and maintain a household.

Credit on their individual

income tax return is given of 10 percent of the first $4,000 of earned
income.

The credit is reduced by 10 percent of taxpayer's adjusted gross

income in excess of $4,000.
The effect of the earned income credit is to reduce the indivi
dual's personal income tax by the amount of his contribution to the OASDI
portion of Social Security (9.9 percent under the assumption that labor
bears the employer's share of the tax through lower wages or higher
prices).

The OASDI tax is then progressive for wages between $4,000

and $8,000, proportional from $8,000 to $16,500, and regressive there
after.
The payroll tax, when considering Social Security in the frame
work of a savings for retirement plan, is an appropriate method to fin
ance the program.

However, the earned-income credit for low-income

workers is a necessary accompaniment because a compulsory savings program
for a family existing at bare subsistence levels cannot be justified.
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The earned income credit should be expanded to include all low-income
families and would then serve to lessen the burden of the Social Security
tax on low-income workers.
Supplemental Security Income
Ms. Munnell recommends that the SSI program be expanded and
modified for it to function best in the welfare role of income mainten
ance.

The means test, which currently reduces the SSI payment $1 for

every $1 payment of Social Security benefits (or unearned income) over
a $20 limit, would be lowered to a 50 percent reduction of benefits for
every dollar.

This would extend assistance to a somewhat higher income

level and serve to make the cutoff point for SSI less adrupt, thereby
eliminating inequities between those who qualify for SSI and those
reliant on Social Security,

In addition, the 50 percent reduction would

ensure that individuals who had earnings deducted for Social Security
would receive some return on their contribution.
Summary
The proposal for reform by Alicia Munnell suggests that the
functions of Social Security, as the program exists today, be separated
between earnings replacement and income maintenance.
The earnings replacement function would remain in the Social
Security program.

Social Security benefits, which would be strictly

related to past contributions, would be appropriately financed through
the payroll tax.

The proportional benefit structure would guarantee

that future retirees receive a positive return on their contributions.
The tax would be identified as compulsory savings, which are a part of
net wages rather than just another tax which reduces take-home pay.
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Welfare-related provisions of Social Security would be dropped
because benefits provided by an expanded SSI program would eliminate
the need for them.

SSI would be financed out of general revenues.

The

primary function of SSI would be the redistribution of income from the
relatively affluent to the poor.

General revenues, as derived mainly

from the progressive personal income tax, would be more efficient in
this function than the regressive payroll tax, in which most revenue is
obtained from the contributions of low- and middle-income workers.
This proposal would reduce long-run costs of the Social Security
program by phasing out secondary dependent benefits to spouses and the
minimum benefit and raising the retirement age.

Costs for welfare-

related provisions of Social Security would be shifted to SSI but prob
ably not reduced, and the tax burden to support them would be similarly
shifted from the payroll tax to the personal and corporate income taxes.
Overall, the major advantage of this proposal is greater efficiency in
achieving the goals of retirement earnings replacement and income main
tenance.
Joseph A. Pechman, Henry J. Aaron and
Michael K. Taussig
"Social Security;

Perspectives for Reform"

hensive history and analysis of Social Security.

31

gives a compre

Shortcomings and

inequities of the system are analyzed, and the authors offer proposals
for reform of the system.
A major deficiency of this work, however, is that it was pub
lished in 1968, and thus predates the onset or the recognition of the

31

The following material is taken from Pechman, Aaron and Taussig,
Perspectives for Reform, pp. 214-227.
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most serious problem confronting Social Security— that of future solvency.
Consequently, some of the authors* suggestions are not feasible now in
light of the bleak financial outlook for the system.

Legislative action

has since been taken on some of the problems they have discussed.

Two

of the authors* recommendations for reform were implemented in 1972 (that
the benefit formula and the maximum taxable wage be automatically adjusted
for changes in the Consumer Price Index; and, that a widow*s benefit be
raised to 100 percent of the worker*s benefit).

Many more of the prob

lems and reforms discussed are contemporary and as pertinent now to Social
Security as they were at that time.
The proposals for reform of the system are divided into two sec
tions:

concepts for total reform as a long-range goal and partial reform

provisions to correct major inadequacies and inequities, while leaving
the basic structure intact.
Total reform
The proposal for total reform addresses the basic dilemma of
Social Security— attempting to solve two problems with one instrument.
These are to prevent destitution among the aged poor and to assure
people, having adequate earnings before retirement, benefits related to
their previous standard of living.

The need for two separate systems

to handle these two problems has been discussed at length in this chapter
as part of Alicia Munnell*s proposal for reform.
The authors of this work and Munnell both propose to retain
Social Security to perform the earnings replacement function and finance
the income support function through general revenues.

This work goes a

step further, however, and recommends a negative income tax be used in
conjunction with the income support plan.
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Under the proposal,
payment would be payable to
levels.

the negative income

tax or public assistance

all households with income below specified

The minimum allowance provided would be equal to a minimum sub

sistence standard of living

for families of all sizes.

Allowances for the aged would be financed out of general revenues,
but administered by Social Security.

For the aged, the plan would require

two calculations— one for the retirement benefit determined by past earn
ings, the other for a negative income tax based on total money income.
The beneficiary would choose the most advantageous benefit.

If the

beneficiary chose the negative income tax benefit, the right to the
earnings related benefit would be waived and a beneficiary would be
subject to the tax rate on all income except a basic allowance.

If

the beneficiary chose the earnings-related benefit, he would be required
to pay a positive income tax on the benefit and on all his additional
income.
The value of a dual system, such as this, is in efficiency and
flexibility.

Under the present system, any attempt to improve benefits

for income support purposes usually requires substantial benefit improve
ments in earnings replacement, which may or may not be necessary.

Since

the two functions are separated in the proposal, either part can be
altered independently of the other and costs of the two functions could
easily be identified.
Partial reform
Pechman et al., suggested that changes in the structure of Social
Security and the negative income tax would not be acceptable to the
American public for some time in the future.

For this reason, the authors

enumerated several proposals to correct what they perceived to be most
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severe deficiencies, which were to be implemented over 10 or 20 years.
Some of the more currently relevant of these will be discussed here.
The combined earnings of both the husband and wife should be
included in average earnings for the purpose of computing benefits.
Since living standards before retirement often depend on salaries or
wages from both when both are employed outside the home, the retirement
benefit should depend on the contributions of both.

The authors suggest

that the retirement benefit should reflect the wife's earnings to the
extent that the husband's falls short of the maximum taxable earnings.
The use of a maximum, set on taxable wages, would be retained.
At the time this argument was developed (1968), the maximum was close
to the median family income.

The authors suggested the maximum taxable

wage level be allowed to rise with the median family income.

Since the

benefit for couples should be higher than that for single persons, (but,
the authors suggest, possible not 1% times the single benefit) the maxi
mum taxable wage for couples should be higher by an amount equal to the
extra income couples require to achieve a given standard of living.
The benefit formula should reflect preretirement standards of
living as indicated by family earnings and size of the family; there
fore, the authors recommend the elimination of the maximum limit on
family benefits.

Under the present system, a family of three and a

family of eight, which survive workers with similar earnings histories,
receive the same amount in benefits.

The present benefit structure does

not reflect the fact that needs increase with the family size.
The authors' studies indicated that each additional person in
a household required an approximate increase of 30 percent of the income
of a single person to maintain an equivalent standard of living.
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on this data, the existing 75 percent of the primary insurance amount
is too generous for a surviving dependent and the family maximum for
large families is inadequate.

32

Moreover, in large families, the sur

viving spouse is less able to earn income outside the home.

To remedy

this inequity, the authors suggest that a flat dollar amount be added
to the basic benefit for each surviving dependent.

In the same way, a

flat dollar amount would be added to the primary insurance amount for
the spouse of a retired worker, rather than a 50 percent increment.
A further problem is the span of time over which the average
monthly wage is determined in calculating benefits.

Currently, benefits

are based on earnings since 1951 or from the time the worker reaches
age 22, eliminating the five years of lowest earnings.

Such a formula

gives too much weight to years in which wages are significantly below
wage levels of years in which benefits are paid.

Instead, the authors

propose that earnings should be adjusted to reflect the relative earnings
level in each year income was received; or, alternatively, earnings might
be computed on the highest 5 years in the previous 15-20 years of employ
ment.
The subject of age for retirement was also addressed.

With the

improvement of health and increased longevity, the authors believe there
is no need to encourage early retirement, and benefits to early retirees
should be suspended in the future.

Problems of those too young to retire

but unfit to work should be handled via the disability provisions of the
program, unemployment compensation, or both.

Moreover, incentives should

32

The family maximum generally prevents surviving families of
three or more members from receiving benefits larger than the benefit
would be for a family of three.
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be provided to encourage later retirement.

A possible way to do this

would be to exempt those over 65 from the payroll tax.

This would also

encourage employers to hire workers over 65 as they would not be required
to pay their share of the payroll tax.

In addition, provisions could be

made to permanently increase benefits for individuals working beyond age
65.

The authors did not believe the earnings test limit should be in

creased, or dropped altogether, in this behalf.
Finally, the payroll tax is discussed as a device to fund Social
Security.

The authors propose that Social Security, as it exists today,

is primarily a tax-transfer system.

The payroll tax is an inferior device

to function in this capacity because the tax is levied on earned wages
only, takes no account of family size or unusual medical expenses, and
is regressive at upper income levels.

Furthermore, the relationship

between taxes paid and benefits received for any worker is remote, at
best.
The payroll tax should eventually be replaced by income taxes.
The two taxes would be integrated in somewhat the same fashion as is
described in Benjamin Okner's proposal for total integration.

The

payroll tax for employees might be retained for psychological reasons,
e.g., to indicate to workers that they have a claim to future support
from the system.

The tax paid by the self-employed should be the same

as that for wage and salaried workers.

The employer's tax should be

paid out of general revenues, because it is generally agreed that the
employer shifts this tax, either to the consumer in the form of higher
prices, or to the worker by way of lower wages.
The proposed alternative solution would be to eliminate the
regressivity of the tax by incorporating the exemption and minimum
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standard deduction features of the personal income tax.

33

Summary

Social Security faces two challenges— the first, that of short
term funding, which demands immediate attention.

The second is more

long-term in nature, requiring a restructuring of the present system
to meet the objectives of income maintenance and earnings replacement
for the aged.
There are many arguments advanced as to which function— income
maintenance or earnings replacement— Social Security was intended to
perform.

Those that believe it was originally income maintenance

(Pechman et al.) propose changes to enhance the welfare provisions of
Social Security.

Those believing the program should be oriented toward

earnings replacement (Munnell) see Social Security, in the future, as a
government sponsored compulsory savings plan.

The proposals for reform

range from drastic restructuring and expansion of Social Security to a
complete phasing out of the system— a position advocated by economist
Milton Friedman.

The following chapter will state this author’s pro

posal for reform of Social Security, given the goals of income mainten
ance and earnings replacement, and the criteria of efficiency and equity.

33

See Okner's proposals for further elaboration on this alter

native.
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CHAPTER IV

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

A Review of the Problem

Social Security, as enacted in 1935, was an experiment for the
U.S. Government in social legislation.

Changing life styles, as the

nation moved from a rural to an urban industrialized society, adversely
affected the economic welfare of the aged.

Standards of living had

greatly improved, allowing for increases in longevity.

At the same

time, the family unit, which had previously supported its aged members,
began losing its cohesiveness with the migration to the cities.

In the

industrialized cities, most means of support were derived from current
cash wages.

Many of the aged, upon retirement, were not financially

prepared for withdrawal from the labor market and consequent loss of
regular income.

Ensuing conditions of widespread poverty among the aged

were further affected by the impact of the depression.
The problem as perceived by government from these conditions,
was a lack of financial security among the aged.

President Roosevelt’s

solution to this problem, and that enacted by Congress, was the Social
Security program.

The original intent of the legislation was to provide

a mandatory government sponsored and administered retirement plan, fin
anced by employer and employee contributions.

The prevailing national

sentiment of individualism and self reliance was in large part responsible
62
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for the contributory aspect of Social Security.

The fact that all were

required to contribute equally to Social Security created a feeling of
earned right to benefits of the program.

Primarily because of this

psychological accomplishment, the program has generally been popular
and widely accepted by the American public.
Social Security, however, did not remain in its original form
for long.

Even before any benefits were paid out of the trust fund,

the nature of the program began changing from a contributory retirement
program to a system of programs attempting to meet many social welfare
needs.

The U.S. had generally lagged behind other industrialized nations

in social welfare legislation, and when the need for such programs became
evident. Social Security became an expedient means to provide them.
Legislation adding welfare-related benefits served to justify even
further additions of such benefits, which, in turn, has resulted in a
patchwork of welfare-related provisions superimposed upon the national
retirement program.
In many instances, under the existing program, it is evident
that individual equity has been sacrificed for social adequacy (e.g.,
the dependent spouse benefit which sometimes allows two-earner couples
to pay more into Social Security but receive less in benefits than a
single-earner couple with the same income).

Because of the numerous

provisions to ensure adequate benefits to all income classes, the link
between benefits received and taxes paid into the program is very weak
at best.

Moreover, in attempting to have Social Security function both

in the role of earnings replacement for retirees and income maintenance
for the needy, the program has, in the past, done a less than equitable
job of the former and an inadequate job of the latter.

In recent years.
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benefits have been substantially increased to better perform the income
maintenance function, but this has resulted in excessive costs, and the
program under the current method of financing, through the payroll tax,
is destined for bankruptcy in the near future.
In other instances, changing economic, social and institutional
conditions have outmoded many of the provisions of Social Security, i.e.,
because Social Security was instituted at a time when men constituted
the bulk of the workforce and were considered the major family bread
winners, a man’s contributions to the OASDI tax was geared to generate
more benefits than a woman's contributions; yet women now constitute 45
percent of the paid workforce and 22 percent of all households are headed
by women.

1

These conditions all point to the need for restructuring the
Social Security system in terms of basic objectives, and redesigning
the system to accomplish these objectives in a more equitable and effic
ient manner.

The Proposed Role for Social Security

Equity and efficiency can best be achieved by redefining the
limits of Social Security.

Enactment of Supplemental Security Income

(SSI) legislation in 1972 and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) in 1974 serve as major steps in this behalf.

SSI, which

guarantees a minimum income to the needy aged, can better provide wel
fare related benefits than Social Security because applicants to this

^U.S., Congress, House, Senator Donald M. Fraser speaking for the
bill to provide equity in Social Security for individuals and families,
94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 June 1976, Congressional Record, 122: 82.
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program must prove need by conforming to certain income and asset limit
ations.

In addition, since SSI is financed out of general revenues

derived primarily from the progressive personal income tax, redistri
bution of income is more efficient than is possible through the OASDI
tax, which comes mainly from the contributions of low- and middle-income
wage earners.

The existence of

SSI thus provides rationale

fordispens

ing with the income maintenance

function of Social Security

andhence,

the steeply progressive benefit structure and other need-related bene
fits.
In the same way, the presence of
pension system (ERISA) provides
urity need not extend benefits.

laws strengthening the private

an upper limit beyond which

Social Sec

ERISA will enable many middle- and upper-

income workers to supplement their Social Security retirement benefits
through private pension plans or individual retirement accounts (IRA's).
The role for Social Security thus circumscribed by SSI and ERISA
is that of providing a floor of income protection for retirees.

Those

individuals whose Social Security benefits are not adequate to bring
their total income above the specified poverty level would be eligible
for SSI benefits.

The accessability of private pension plans and IRA's

would allow individuals with additional resources during their working
years to add to this floor of income protection to the degree that they
desire and are able to finance personally.
The scope of Social Security should also be narrowed to exclude
health insurance.

The Medicare trust fund currently receives a 1-8 per

centage point share of the 11.7 percent combined employee-employer pay
roll tax.

Unlike retirement benefits, which are figured on a worker's

average monthly wage. Medicare (Part A) hospitalization and related

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
health care payments are determined by the providers of these services.
Under these circumstances, the financing of such costs through the pay
roll tax is inefficient and serves to further weaken the connection
between taxes paid and benefits received.

These costs should, instead,

be financed through general revenues as are a portion of Medicare Part B
costs.

2

Moreover, quite probably in the next few years, some form of

national health insurance will be enacted by Congress.

Several proposals

are currently under consideration and President Carter has Indicated
national health insurance to be a major goal of his administration.

Any

such plan would likely supersede the function of Social Security in
health insurance.
With the role of Social Security thus limited, the program can
revert to an actuarially sound national pension plan in which contri
butions made throughout a worker's career determine the benefits received
upon retirement.

In essence. Social Security would become a mandatory

savings plan forcing workers, who would not otherwise do so, to set
aside a portion of their wages for their old age.
The proposed changes and adjustments to the present program
required for such restructuring are significant-

These will be examined

in terms of equity and efficiency acheived in providing for financial
security of the aged, economic impact and political feasibility.

2

Supplementary Medical Insurance (Medicare Part B) is financed
through contributions of those wishing to participate in the program,
with these funds matched by the federal government out of general reven
ues.
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Benefits

The Benefit Formula
Because Social Security would be a wage-related retirement pro
gram, the benefits based on welfare considerations which are presently
paid would be eliminated.

The benefit formula in effect in 1977 con

tains seven factors which are used, along with a worker’s career average
monthly wage, to determine the worker's primary insurance amount— from
which almost all other benefits are calculated.

The formula is structured

in such a way that low-wage workers receive a considerably larger propor
tion of their average monthly wages in benefits than do those in higher
income brackets, ranging from 137.77 percent for the first $100 of a
worker's average wage to 22.78 percent when average wages exceed $1,000
(see Chapter II, page 14).
The author's proposal would replace this progressive benefit
formula with a proportional earnings replacement ratio.

The wage replace

ment rate would be equal at all income levels, and benefits would be
strictly related to contributions made to Social Security.

A wage re

placement rate considered desirable would be between 50 and 60 percent
of preretirement gross earnings.

This low rate can be justified by the

fact that living and work-related expenses decline following retirement.
In addition. Medicare pays for most medical expenses of the elderly, and
some retirement income, including Social Security, is tax exempt.

It is

anticipated that such a replacement rate will not be adequate for all
retirees.

Low-income workers, partially dependent upon welfare programs

prior to retirement, generally will find Social Security benefits inade
quate and will be reliant on SSI to supplement these benefits.
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income individuals, whose wages consistently exceed maximum taxable
earnings, would be required to have additional sources of retirement
income in order to maintain their accustomed standard of living.
The current method of computing benefits averages monthly wages
over the working life of an individual (from 1951 or age 22, whichever
occurs later, until retirement age), leaving out the 5 years of lowest
earnings.

The primary insurance amount (PIA) is then determined using

this average and the benefit formula in effect at the time.

Under the

proposal, records of actual contributions would be kept for Social Sec
urity participants over their working lives.

Upon retirement, the worker's

benefit would be determined based on these contributions and the appropri
ate actuarial factors, such as life expectancy at the age of retirement
and earnings of trust fund investments.
The following table lists wage replacement rates possible under
varying conditions of number of years spent in covered employment and
the rate of interest obtained from investments of trust funds.

The rates,

2.5 percent, 3 percent and 3.5 percent in the table, represent possible
net earnings of the Social Security trust fund.

Overall return on Social

Security funds in fiscal year ending June 30, 1976 was 6.5 percent;

3

how

ever, Alicia Munnell states that net earnings on the Social Security trust
fund are between 2 and 3 percent.

4

The variance between these rates is

assumed to be administrative costs of the system.

Under the proposed

3
This rate reflects a combination of securities purchased at vary
ing rates. The Treasury rate, at the time this article was written, was
7% percent, but the average rate is depressed by securities purchased some
time ago at rates as low as 2 3/4 percent.
"What Happens to your Social
Security Taxes?" U.S. News & World Report, 1 March 1976, p. 7.
^Alicia H. Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," p. 26.
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reform, requiring Social Security to be actuarially sound, the trust
fund should Increase; consequently, administrative expenses will be a
smaller proportion of Investment revenue and net rate of return on earn
ings of the fund will Increase.

For these reasons, 2.5 to 3.5 percent

would seem to be conservative estimates for use In this computation.

TABLE 3
POSSIBLE WAGE REPLACEMENT RATES

Interest Rates on Trust Fund
Years Worked in
Covered Employment

2.5%

3.0%

3.5%

15

15%

15%

16%

20

20%

21%

23%

30

32%

35%

38%

40

45%

50%

56%

50

59%

68%

78%

In obtaining these ratios, it was assumed that the real rate of
growth In average wages Is 1.5 percent per year.

This rate reflects

only wage Increases due to Increased productivity and eliminates the
effects of Inflation on wages.

It was also assumed that real increases

In the maximum taxable wage will be 1.5 percent per year and that the
life expectancy of workers, at the time of retirement, is 13 years.
Under these assumptions and based on this table, a wage earner who has
worked 40 years In Social Security covered employment and has a monthly
taxable salary of $1,375, can expect monthly retirement benefits of
$687.50 If the funds have earned 3 percent Interest or benefits of $770
at 3.5 percent interest on the trust fund.
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Need-related Benefits
Certain benefit provisions, which have been incorporated into
Social Security to ensure social adequacy, are inconsistent in a wagerelated retirement system such as the one proposed.

Two such provisions

are the minimum benefit and the special minimum primary insurance amount.
The minimum benefit was introduced as a base under which no worker's
benefit could fall.

Up to 1972 it rose twice as fast as other benefits,

and under the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act, this benefit
became governed by the automatic escalator clause, as other benefits.
The minimum benefit is currently $107.40.
The special minimum primary insurance amount was enacted in
1972 and is designed to help people who have worked in covered employ
ment for many years, but have low earnings.

The special minimum PIA^

is applied when it is higher than the PIA related to average monthly
wages.
Because the minimum benefit and the special minimum PIA have no
basis in contributions into the system, and are solely a means to ensure
adequate retirement income for low-wage workers and/or workers who have
spent little time in covered employment, these provisions would be
eliminated under the proposed reform.

Inadequate retirement income can

be supplemented more efficiently through Supplemental Security Income.

Effective March, 1974, the special minimum PIA equals $9 multi
plied by the number of years of coverage the person has in excess of 10
years, up to a maximum of 30 years. Thus, the highest benefit under the
provision is $180 a month. U.S., Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, Social Security Administration, Amendments Chart Booklet: OASDI,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 4.
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Dependent Spouse Benefits
Dependent spouse benefits, as noted in Chapter III, are the
source of major inequities in Social Security.

The primary reason for

this is that the OASDI payroll tax is levied on the individual worker;
whereas, the benefits generated by this worker’s wage history are deter
mined by the family unit.

Single persons and married two-earner couples

receive less proportionally in benefits than do married couples in which
only the husband has worked, even though taxes paid may be as much or
more.

Further inequities stem from social and economic conditions that

prevailed during the early development years of Social Security.

Men

were considered the family breadwinners and women, the homemakers, depen
dent on their husbands' income; consequently, the nature of retirement
benefits followed the same pattern.
mines the benefits for both.

The husband's work history deter

Since the wife's benefit is derived from

the husband's work record, the structure of Social Security depends to
a large part on the institution of marriage and its permanence.^

How

ever, as women's participation in the work force increases^ and the
national divorce rate ascends to an all time high, different assumptions

Dependent spouse benefits to a divorced woman are not payable
unless the marriage lasted at least 20 years. Under these circumstances,
a woman is not eligible for benefits derived from her ex-husband's earn
ings history until
reaches age 65 and retires. Thus, a woman who is
older than her ex-husband cannot receive retirement benefits or Medicare
until past the normal retirement age. U.S., Congress, House, Subcommit
tee on Aging, Social Security Inequities Against Women, Tish Sommers,
94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), p. 6.
^According to the February, 1976 Monthly Labor Review, the
average worklife of the 18-year-old female in 1970 was 33.9 years.
Donald M. Fraser, "Equity in Social Security," Congressional Record.
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need to be made with regard to dependent benefits, and the Social
Security system must be adjusted accordingly.
These assumptions are that:

(1)

marriage is, in part, an

economic contract between two equal persons which may or may not last
a lifetime; (2)
(3)

work records of individuals are not always static; and

taxes and benefits, to be equitable, must be based on the same

economic unit.
The author’s proposal to reform this aspect of Social Security
follows the lines of legislation introduced into the U.S. House of
Representatives by Representative Donald M. Fraser (D. Minnesota).

It

has been modified somewhat to accomodate the author's basic premise that
Social Security should be a wage-related retirement program.
Under this proposal for reform, derivative benefits (benefits
received through the wage record of another) of spouses will be phased
out.

Instead ofdependent benefits, each adult will obtain a Social

Security wage record of his/her own on

which to

collect benefits.

Basic

to this provision is a recognition that the wife who remains in the home
as a "homemaker" contributes to the economic well-being of the family on
an equal basis with the husband; and, should consequently share in retire
ment benefits made possible through the efforts of both.
The changes proposed will affect (1)

married couples in which

both the husband

and wife are employed outside of the home; and (2)

those couples in

which only one member works in

covered employment.In

the case of the former. Social Security contribution credits earned in
covered employment by both individuals will be combined and split evenly
between husband and wife.

This can be facilitated through the indivi

dual federal income tax return.

At the end of each year, when tax returns
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are filed, information on Social Security contributions can be taken
from the W-2 forms submitted.

Since Social Security identification

numbers of husband and wife are included on the taw form, the contri
butions can be easily posted from this source to each Social Security
record on the proposed equal share basis.

(Use of the federal tax form

in this manner would, in no way, affect the federal tax payment.

It is

suggested here as a convenient method to ensure the proper record-keep
ing of Social Security contribution credits, upon which future benefits
are based.)
In the same way, couples in which only one member worked in
covered employment, would have Social Security contribution credits
obtained by this worker split equally between husband and wife and
posted to both individual Social Security records annually via the fed
eral income tax return.

The division of contribution credits would be

mandatory; that is, if the box indicating marital status on the 1RS
form is checked "Married," (filing either jointly or separately), Social
Security tax contributions would automatically be divided equally between
husband and wife.

Employers' share of the Social Security tax would be

similarly credited, based on each employee's reported marital status.
In this way, every adult who had ever worked in Social Security
covered employment or who had been married to an individual in covered
employment, would have a Social Security record for benefit purposes.
This record would be portable.

It would stay with the individual as a

claim to future benefits regardless of marital status— an individual may
marry, be widowed, divorce or remarry without losing benefits.

The Social

Security record would belong to the individual rather than the marriage.
Because virtually all adults would have Social Security contribution
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credits, the need for derivative spouse benefits would cease.

In the

same way, this proposal would result in virtually all adults being eli
gible for disability benefits.

Currently, eligibility for disability

coverage required substantial recent attachment to covered employment.
Many workers— and especially females— are unable to obtain these bene
fits because they do not have static work records.

Several factors may

contribute to the interruption of careers of one or the other partner in
a marriage, i.e., factors related to having and raising children; contin
uing of education; and the lack of job opportunities for one partner in
the geographical area in which the other is employed.

With the porta

bility and sharing of work records in this proposal, adverse affects of
these non-static work records will be minimized.

As long as one spouse

is employed, both would have current Social Security contribution credits,
and thus be eligible for disability benefits.
Under this provision, dependent surviving children would be able
to claim survivorship benefits based on either parents' tax contribution
record or both in the event that both are deceased.

The proposal would

also provide survivor benefits for the spouse over 50 years old with no
record of covered employment, because it is recognized that such indivi
duals would have considerable difficulty entering the labor force at this
age with no prior work experience or employable skills.

These benefits

would be based on the deceased spouse's contribution record and would
be payable until retirement age.

At this time, retirement benefits would

be payable based on the individual's own Social Security record.

Benefits

received based on a deceased spouse's contribution record would need to be
subject to Social Security tax in order for the surviving spouse to main
tain disability coverage.

Such taxes would also increase retirement bene

fits, but a provision such as this should be optional.
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This proposal, by requiring that contributions be divided
between both spouses in a marriage, will serve to equalize retirement
benefits between men and women.

(Currently, average Social Security

benefits for retired women are 80 percent of those for retired men.)
This proposal would minimize a woman's dependence on her husband or on
the longevity of their marriage for Social Security purposes.

Neither

women nor men would have advantageous rights to benefits as under the
present law where men are required to prove dependency to receive deriv
ative benefits for which women are automatically eligible.
This proposal would serve to increase work incentives.

Under

the current system, the Social Security taxes paid by a wife while en
gaged in covered employment often add nothing to the benefits the couple
will eventually receive.

This will be the case if her average monthly

wage amounts to less than one-half that of her husband's— a common occur
ence because of the non-static nature of a married woman's career.

In

these instances, the desirability of the wife holding a job in outside
employment diminishes under the realization that retirement benefits for
the couple are the same whether she works or not.

Under the proposed

system, each person would receive a positive return on his or her contri
butions.

If both husband and wife worked in covered employment. Social

Security benefits would be increased for both by the incremental amount
of taxes paid.

Equity would be achieved for single workers because they

would no longer be subsidizing the dependent benefits of their fellow
married workers.
Financing Social Security
The Social Security payroll tax, viewed as a means to redistri
bute income from the affluent to the poor— a role currently assigned to
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Social Security— is not an effective mechanism for this purpose.

The

tax is levied without regard to ability to pay or provisions for number
of dependents or unusual medical expenses.

Furthermore, it taxes only

earned income and exempts wages over a maximum.

However, by redefining

the goals of Social Security, transfering income redistribution functions
to the SSI program, the OASDI tax becomes an adequate and equitable means
to finance a compulsory savings-for-retirement plan.

As benefits are to

be proportional to taxes paid and hence to earnings (beneath the maximum
taxable wage), benefits received upon retirement would reflect an indivi
dual's relative standard of living prior to retirement.
Financing Social Security through the payroll tax fulfills the
criterion of individual equity.

Under this proposal, a distinct rela

tionship exists between taxes and benefits— in order to provide finan
cial viability to the program and also as an important psychological
device to demonstrate to recipients an earned right to benefits,
significant problem among the aged is that of dependency.

A

Dependence,

whether on the charitable nature of relatives or societal institutions,
tends to erode self esteem and create feelings of worthlessness.

Since

Social Security is first and foremost a retirement system for the aged,
such problems should be considered in redesigning the system.

Retire

ment benefits derived directly from "savings" over the years of employ
ment establishes financial independence for the elderly.

For these

reasons, the author feels it is important to retain the OASDI tax to
finance Social Security.
Because benefits will be dependent upon contributions, most of
the current and future financing problems of Social Security will be
resolved.

The problem of over-adjustment of benefits for effects of
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inflation will no longer be relevant.

Elimination of the steeply pro

gressive benefit formula and minimum benefit provisions will further
lessen the burden of Social Security.

The worst financial threats to

the program, under the proposed reform, would be those faced by private
insurance companies— inaccurate actuarial assumptions and losses suf
fered by declining investment values.

The latter factor would not

adversely affect Social Security because of the nature of investments—
U.S. Government securities.

Although such investments yield a lower

rate of return than corporate stocks and bonds, they are thought prefer
able because of their soundness.

Investment of Social Security funds in

corporate securities would be undesirable because of the control it would
give the federal government over private enterprise.
The Social Security "contingency" fund will revert back to a
"trust" fund— as was originally intended— of the type insurance companies
maintain to provide for future liabilities.

Because Social Security will

no longer be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, the fund, fed by OASDI
receipts, will begin increasing, reflecting the fact that need-related
benefits are being funded from general revenues.

A large trust fund will

mean more money available for capital accumulation and investment, revers
ing the trend toward a potential capital shortage, which many economists
believe is partially caused by the Social Security system in its present
form.

Increased investments generated by Social Security trust funds

will result in a higher rate of economic growth.
Under the premise that contributions into the OASDI trust funds,
over an individual's career, will yield a floor of income protection at
retirement, and that contributions and benefits should be proportional
at all income levels, certain adjustments need to be made to the existing
payroll tax structure.
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The current tax rate of 5.85 percent for employees and employers
alike would be retained and held constant.

The author's studies have

shown that contributions at this rate, over the average work life of an
individual are adequate to provide a "floor" of income protection after
retirement.

The tax rate for self-employed individuals will need to be

increased from the present 7.9 percent to 11.7 percent, in lieu of the
employer's share of the tax, in order to accumulate benefits commensurate
with benefits of those employed by others.

This is equitable under the

assumption that employers pass on their share of the payroll tax to labor
in the form of higher prices or lower wages to employees.
A similar problem exists with regard to the tax rate on a mar
ried worker whose spouse is not employed in covered employment.

Under

the current system, equal tax contributions by single and married indivi
duals result in different benefit amounts— that for the married indivi
dual being

ih

times that for the single person.

In this proposal the

married worker, whose spouse is not employed, will be, in effect, earn
ing Social Security credits for two future retirees.

If the taxes paid

by this individual are relatively the same as those paid by a single
person, the presence of the taxable maximum on earnings may prevent the
accumulation of sufficient retirement income to support husband and wife
at the same relative standard of living as before retirement.

A possible

remedy would be to require the single-earner couple to contribute to a
higher maximum taxable wage or at a higher rate than that for a single
person (or married persons where both work in covered employment).

The

former alternative is thought preferable so as not to increase the tax
burden on low-income workers.

Increasing the maximum taxable wage of

the employee by only 60 percent would result in an incremental increase
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g

in benefits of 30 percent.

(This is in line with studies conducted by

Pechman, Aaron and Taussig that determined each additional person in a
household required an additional 30 percent of the income of a single
person to maintain an equivalent standard of living.

See Chapter III,

pages 58-59.)
In order to maintain benefits at a level consistent with real
increases in wages and changes in the cost of living, the maximum tax
able wage will have to be adjusted periodically to reflect these changes.
The method suggested to accomplish this is an automatic escalator provi
sion similar to that in the 1972 amendments.

However, this escalator

provision will not affect benefit computation— rather, it would allow
the maximum taxable wage to change with average taxable wages.

9

In this

way, contributions and ultimate benefits will keep pace with inflation
and productivity Increases.
Since benefits will be strictly proportional to contributions
under this proposal, it would be possible to pass legislation to allow
individuals the alternative of dropping out of Social Security; however,
it would be necessary to require individuals, who so chose, to furnish
proof that they had accumulated funds of the same amount or greater for
retirement purposes elsewhere in a fund which would only be accessible
upon retirement.

These individuals would be required to contribute to

g

The incremental benefit is one-half the additional contribution
because only the employee would be required to pay taxes to a higher
maximum. The maximum taxable wage for the employer*s share of the tax
would be unaffected.
9
This could be done by taking a ratio of average taxable wages in
the year of determination to the year in which the last adjustment was
made, and changing the maximum taxable wage by the percent arrived at.
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Social Security throughout the year (as would their employers) but would
receive their contribution back at the end of the year as a refund through
the individual income tax return.

This provision would allow the trust

fund use of these taxes for a year and also serve as a disincentive (in
the form of inconvenience) for those considering leaving the program.
The employer's share of taxes for these persons would remain in the trust
fund, ensuring some Social Security retirement benefits for them.

Those

persons who choose to save via a private means would contribute to the
accumulation of savings for capital formation.

Earned Income Credit
A necessary accompaniment to the payroll tax in a compulsory
savings plan, such as that proposed, is an expanded earned income credit
provision in the federal individual income tax.
provide tax relief for low-income workers.

This is desirable to

It is unreasonable to require

poor persons to save for their retirement if such reduction in take home
pay compels them to borrow at exhorbitant rates in order to subsist from
day to day.

The effect of the earned income credit is to reduce the fed

eral income tax of low-income workers by the amount of their contribution
to the OASDI portion of Social Security, up to earnings of $8,000.

The

amount of the earned income credit should be adjusted periodically for
changes in the cost of living so that it will reflect constant 1977 dol
lars.

The earned income credit currently applies only to workers who have

children and maintain a household.

This should be extended to include

all low-income families, but at a lower income level to reflect less need
for this credit.
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Retirement Age
The trend in recent years has been to encourage retirement at
earlier ages.

This trend, coupled with the effects of increased longev

ity and an increase in the proportion of aged persons in the population
are the basis for a significant portion of the projected deficits in
Social Security.

The author believes Social Security has been a major

factor in establishing the normal retirement age by specifying 65 as
the age at which retirement benefits are payable and requiring recipients
of benefits to satisfy an earnings test.

The introduction of actuarially

reduced benefits at age 62, has served to further lower the retirement
age.

Social Security probably has also acted to set standards for other

retirement programs and has conditioned social attitudes toward retire
ment.
The encouragement of early retirement can be rationalized under
past and current demographic conditions.

The substantial increases in

births following World War II, and continuing up through 1960, have
resulted in a relatively large labor force as this segment of the popula
tion reaches working age.

Because there are many workers for a limited

number of available jobs, it appears desirable to provide for early
retirement of older, less productive workers— freeing up jobs for the
young entering the labor market.

However, the author believes the present

is not indicative of the future.

The post-war baby boom was an isolated

deviation in the demographic trend which has persisted since the year
1800.

In this time period, fertility or birth rates declined from a

little more than 7.0 in 1800 to 3.7 in 1960.
rate was cut in half to 1.8 in 1975.

Since 1960, the fertility

Official projections of the Social
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Security Administration in 1976 assume thatthis downward
checked at 1.75 in 1977, to begin a gradual

trend will be

upswing. The fertility rate

is expected to reach 1.9 by the year 2005, where it will remain constant,
generating a slowly declining population.
Based on these assumptions, the age composition of the popula
tion will undergo a significant change in the 21st century as the ratio
of non-working aged persons to those persons of working age increases.
By the year 2010 this ratio should approximate 1 to 3.^^
stances are responsible for this change:

(1)

baby boom years will be reaching retirement

Two circum

those born during the
age; and

(2) those born in

the current period, when the birth rate is less than what would be re
quired for zero population growth, will be the working population.
Under these assumptions and events affecting demographic make
up, it is readily apparent why future Social Security taxes will need
to be increased considerably, given the current pay-as-you-go method of
financing— fewer workers will be required to support more receiving
retirement benefits.

However, in the same way, because there will be

fewer persons of working age, there is also less justification, on the
grounds of job availability, for continuing to encourage earlier retire
ment.
Moreover, because of increases in longevity (between 1930 and
1970, life expectancy at age 65 increased from 12.2 to 15.2 years), and
relatively better health of those individuals at retirement age, the

^^Alicia Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," pp. 11-13.
^^Gurrently this ratio is 1 to 7.

See Chapter II, page 26.
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author believes a later retirement age should be gradually phased in.
A method of doing this would be to increase the age of retirement by
one month every six months beginning in 2005 and ending in 2023, at
which time the retirement age would be 68.
Extending the retirement age would better the economic welfare
of the aged in two ways;

(1)

by allowing the aged to continue their

working lives longer, the period over which they suffer reduced retire
ment income would be decreased; and (2)

a longer work history would

generate larger retirement benefits payable upon reaching age 68.
Slowly phasing in a later age at which retirement benefits are
paid will serve to gradually condition workers to the fact of extended
work careers.

It is not necessary that all workers postpone retirement

until age 68.

Many will probably have private pension plans that pro

vide benefits at earlier ages.

(Organized labor contracts now often

call for mandatory retirement at age 60.)

Early retirement under other

pension plans will in no way affect the payment of Social Security bene
fits at age 68— except that benefits will be lower than if workers had
paid into the fund for more years.

In the same way, individuals who

wish to work will not be required to cease their careers at 68 in order
to obtain benefits.

Since benefits are determined by contributions and

have their basis in individual equity rather than social adequacy, an
earnings test determining need is inappropriate and would be eliminated
under this proposal.

Doing away with this highly unpopular aspect of

Social Security would encourage even later retirement— past 68 for those
who wish and would generally improve the economic welfare of these indi
viduals .
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Those persons unable to continue work to the proposed retirement
age because of physical impairments would be eligible to receive benefits
through disability provisions of Social Security.

Procedures to deter

mine eligibility for disability coverage under Social Security may be
set up in such a way that requirements are liberalized with increasing
age, i.e., permanent and total disability as a condition for payment of
Social Security benefits under age 60; 60 to 70 percent disability, a
condition for benefits between the ages of 60 and 65; and 50 percent
disability required from age 65 to 68.

12

Disability benefits would

necessarily be lower than those payable at retirement because of fewer
years of contributions, and would possibly be further reduced by actu
arial assumptions, as to life expectancy, at the age that benefit pay
ments begin.

Because of this, these individuals may be eligible for

benefits under the disability provisions of SSI

13

and/or federal and

state unemployment programs.

The Role of Supplemental Security Income

The enactment of SSI, in 1972, marked a major turning point in
the philosophy governing Social Security and the OASDI tax.

Prior to

that time, federally sponsored need-related programs had been assimi
lated into Social Security under the apparent assumption that OASDI tax
revenues were unlimited.

The results were the necessary increases in

this tax and the current projections for insolvency.

By providing

12
Pechman, Aaron, and Taussig, Perspectives for Reform, p. 141.
13

SSI provisions for the blind and disabled of any age are the
same as those provisions for the aged.
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benefits strictly determined by need, SSI indicates an avenue by which
the income maintenance burden of Social Security can be removed.

Al

though SSI is under the Social Security Administration, it is fully
funded through general tax revenues and, consequently, can be main
tained without further increases in the regressive OASDI tax.
It is the author’s belief that SSI will provide the basis upon
which additional income maintenance programs are structured, replacing
the fragmented network of state-run welfare programs and need-related
provisions of Social Security.

Since SSI guarantees a monthly income

of $167.80 per month for an aged (or blind or disabled) person and
$251.80 for a couple, the rationale for the Social Security minimum
benefit ($107.40) and the special minimum PIA (ranging from $9 to $180)
is virtually eliminated.

Other need-related provisions of Social Secu

rity, such as those met by the progressive benefit formula, can be simi
larly transferred to a modified SSI program.

SSI should be broadened to

better interface with Social Security under the proposed reform.
Currently, SSI benefits are reduced $1 for every $2 in earnings
over $65 a month and reduced dollar for dollar for other unearned income
over $20, which includes Social Security benefits, workmen’s compensation,
veterans pensions, annuities and gifts.

This implicit tax on other un

earned income should be reduced to 50 percent as it is for earnings, i.e.,
for every $2 of other income, the SSI benefit is reduced $1.

(The $20

deductible does not seem to be of material importance, under the proposed
modification, and should be eliminated.)
higher income level.

This would extend benefits to a

In this way, those low-wage earners, who benefit

from the current progressive Social Security benefit structure, will be
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protected against a decline in retirement income by the introduction of
the proposed proportional benefit structure.
Table 4 illustrates how the expanded SSI program would inter
face with the proposed Social Security benefit structure to guarantee
income protection to all retirees.

Income protection provided by the

present Social Security and SSI provisions is also shown for compari
son purposes.

The wage replacement rate used in illustrating the pro

posed system is 50 percent, which is the replacement rate possible on
contributions into Social Security for 40 years, assuming earnings
grow in line with the real rate of growth in average wages and invest
ments of the trust fund earn at least 3 percent interest (see page 69).

Implementation of the Reform

The changes in Social Security called for in this proposal are
radical.
years.

In some instances, implementation will need to be over several
An initial step in bringing about the proposed reform is the

elimination of minimum benefit and special minimum primary insurance
amount (PIA) provisions.

This action, however, will need to be taken

concurrently with the recommended changes in the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program.

An expanded SSI program will then also protect

the income of those individuals who currently gain from the steeply
progressive Social Security benefit formula, and thus facilitate the
elimination of this method of figuring benefits.
Changing the computation of benefits from a formula based on
average monthly wages to one directly determined by contributions will
require a phasing-in stage.

During this time, figuring benefits for

newly retired persons would require two computations;

one under the
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TABLE *
COMPARISON OF BENEFIT LEVELS AND REPLACEMENT RATES
FOR RETIREES UNDER PRESENT AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS

Present System*

Earnings^

Monthly^
Earnings

60 Percent of
Minimum Wage

$

Social
Security
Benefit

Replacement
Rate

SSI*
Benefit

Combined
Benefit

Combined
Replacement
Rate

219.00

$165.00

.76

$ 12.20

$177.70

Low

286.58

178.50

.62

- 0 -

178.50

.62

Lower Middle

487.25

238.20

.49

— 0 —

238.20

.49

Median

687.92

298.50

.43

— 0 “

298.50

.43

Higher Middle

931.46

329. 30

.35

- 0 -

329.30

.35

1,175.00

364.00

.31

- 0 -

364.00

.31

High

.81

Proposed Proportional Benefit System

Earnings^

Monthly®
Earnings

60 Percent of
Minimum Wage

$

Social
Security
Benefit

Replacement
Rate

SSI Benefit,
50 Percent
Implicit Tax,
No Deductible

Combined
Benefit

Combined
Replacement
Rate

219.(X)

$109.50

.50

$102.95

$212.45

.97

Low

286.58

143.29

.50

86.06

229.35

.80

Lower Middle

487.25

243.63

.50

35.89

279.52

.57

Median

687.92

343.96

.50

- 0 -

343.96

.50

Higher Middle

931.46

465.73

.50

- 0 -

465.73

.50

1,175.00

587.50

.50

- 0 -

587.50

.50

High

*The data In the top portion o f this table la taken from Alicia B. Munnell, "The Future
of Social Security," p. 20.
^It fa aasuned these individuals had a smooth annual Income growth.
^These persons' AMW's are $157, $184, $313, $442, $514, and $586, respectively, under the
present system.
^Social Security benefits are figured on the January, 1976 benefit formula.
*SSI benefits are figured on the benefit amounts effective January, 1976.
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current benefit formula and the other based on total contributions used
in conjunction with an expanded SSI program, as proposed.
would then be entitled to the larger of the two amounts.

The retiree
Payments to

retiring persons, ineligible for additional benefits under SSI, will not
be affected by the proposal for some time in the future.
ments to those persons already retired change.

Nor would pay

This is because the 1977

Social Security benefit formula currently provides an individual with
considerably larger payments than those possible through the invest
ment of his OASDHI tax payments from the program's inception.

For

example, under the proposal, a man retiring in December, 1976, at age 65
would be entitled to a benefit of only $135 per month.

This assumes that

he has contributed to Social Security to the maximum amount every year
since the tax was initiated (40 years), and trust fund monies have earned
a net return of 3 percent per year.

This compares to a PIA for this same

person of approximately $398 under the June, 1976 benefit formula.
The low benefit obtained under the proposal is due to low maxi
mum taxable amounts and tax rates in the early years of Social Security,
e.g., $60 was the largest possible combined employee-employer contribu
tion for the first 13 years that the OASDI tax was levied, (see Chapter II,
page 23).

Consequently, the proposed benefit calculation will not improve

the payments to most persons until beyond the turn of the century when
persons retiring would have paid taxes for many years at the rates and
taxable levels introduced in the 1970’s.

Between the years 2010 and 2020,

full implementation of benefits based on contributions can begin.
On the other hand, the benefits to persons with low wage records
will generally be higher under the author's proposal than under the
current system, because of the expansion of the SSI program to extend
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these payments to higher income levels; therefore, it will be advanta
geous for these persons to have benefits computed under the proposal.
It is important, during the years of transition, that the legis
lation providing for automatic escalation of Social Security benefits
be rescinded, and that no further benefit increases be made— to minimize
costs of the program.

The income of retirees with low benefits will be

protected against inflation by SSI payments, periodically adjusted for
changes in the cost of living.

The benefits of new retirees will reflect

increases in the cost of living, since this proposal provides for the
automatic adjustment of the maximum taxable wage (assuming that their
preretirement wages had also increased to reflect cost of living changes
and their contributions to Social Security had thus increased.)
The author feels that the earnings test should be dropped imme
diately to establish Social Security as unrelated to welfare programs.
The additional expense resulting from this will be offset by the elimi
nation of minimum benefit provisions.
An SSI program, expanded to take over the welfare functions of
Social Security, will require increased general revenue funding.

Some

of these funds can be obtained from reductions in child welfare pay
ments thought possible because of the recent decline in birth rates,
which will result in proportionally fewer young people.

In addition,

welfare costs, under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program,
are expected to be cut substantially.

Recent legislation, which provides

more efficient methods of tracing absentee fathers of children on wel
fare and forcing them to support their children, is expected to lower
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these costs by $1 billion a year.^^

The author believes SSI is an

appropriate alternative use for these funds.
The changes in record keeping, which provide for the sharing of
Social Security contribution credits by both partners in a marriage,
should begin at once.

These changes should also be applied retroac

tively— both for those of working age and those individuals currently
retired.

Benefits for retirees should then be recomputed under the

effective benefit formula.

When the recomputed amount is more than

the benefit being received by an individual, the retiree will be entitled
to the recomputed amount.

Benefits for newly retired persons will be

similarly computed twice with the retiree entitled to the larger of the
two amounts.

This provision can be fully implemented and derivative

spouse benefits eliminated at a time to coincide with the changeover in
methods of computing benefits as described above.
The shared-contribution provision should increase the retirement
benefits of women overall in relation to men’s benefits; however, putting
Social Security on an actuarially sound basis will probably offset this
change somewhat because of the longer life expectancy of women.

Those

persons benefiting primarily from this provision will be divorced persons,
married less than 20 years who, under the current record keeping method,
have little or no wage credits; and married couples, where both are
employed outside of the home.

Single-earner couples will have benefits

reduced somewhat, and those with higher incomes will have to pay more
in contributions because of higher maximum taxable wages.

14

Sylvia Porter, "Tracing Absentee Fathers," Great Falls (Montana)
Tribune, 8 April 1977, p. 18.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In studying Social Security— noting the numerous criticisms of
the system and predictions of financial collapse in the near future— it
was reasonable to speculate on abandoning Social Security altogether.
Economist and Nobel Prize winner, Milton Friedman, advocates such action,
and would replace Social Security and current income maintenance programs
with a negative income tax, which would guarantee a minimum income to all,
based on the cost of living.

Such a program has merits in efficiency and

simplicity— one device to relieve everybody's financial woes— and is a
suitable method for providing of pure need-related payments.

However, the

problems and needs resulting from reduced earning power of the elderly who
have always been self-sufficient are different from those of persons reli
ant on society's support most of their lives.
lems should be treated differently.

Consequently, these prob

Substituting a negative income tax

for Social Security ignores a factor which was of primary importance to
the drafters of the original Social Security Act, and one which the author
believes is still relevant now and will be in the future— the American
belief that individuals should be able to provide for their own support.
Social Security, because it is contributory, exemplifies this belief and
projects to recipients the feeling of an earned right to benefits.

The

author believes this concept of earned right serves an important psycho
logical function and has contributed a great deal to the wide acceptance
of Social Security.
91
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Social Security has many other features which make it attractive
to the American public.

The program has complete portability of covered

service and pension rights, i.e., earnings with different employers are
combined to compute a worker's retirement benefit.

Unlike a private

pension plan, there is little incentive to change jobs or remain in one
because of losing or gaining rights to Social Security.

Social Security

is available to nearly all workers and provides a floor of income protec
tion for them upon retirement.

Moreover, participation in Social Security

generates many other benefits— survivors, disability and health.
In sum, the author believes the advantages of such a national
contributory retirement plan are valuable enough to justify its reten
tion; however, the potential bankruptcy of Social Security, its inequi
ties, inadequacies and outmoded provisions necessitate a comprehensive
reform of the program.
Two objectives were predominant in formulating this proposal for
reform of Social Security:

(1)

to ensure the financial viability of the

program for future generations of retired Americans; and (2)

to ensure

its political viability and continued support by the American public.
Under this reform proposal, the conglomeration of benefits which
currently comprise the Social Security system would be split up based on
the function they are intended to perform.

Those benefit provisions

which serve primarily as income maintenance for the poor would be trans
ferred to an expanded SSI program in order to perform this function most
efficiently and adequately.

As part of SSI, these benefits would be

financed through general revenues.

Those benefit provisions, which

serve the purpose originally intended for Social Security— that of earn
ings replacement for retired workers— would be retained as Social Security
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and be financed through the OASDI tax.

Under the proposal, these

benefits will be modified to accommodate changed life styles and to
ensure equitable treatment of all persons who participate in Social
Security.
This proposal recommends that a later age at which retirement
benefits are paid should be gradually phased-in to provide more substan
tial benefits during retirement years.

This provision would significan

tly improve the economic well-being of the elderly, along with the recom
mended elimination of the earnings test, and can be further justified
by demographic trends and increased longevity.

It is also desirable to

expand the earned income credit, under the federal income tax law, to
provide tax relief to the poor.
Under the reform proposal, many of the defects of Social Security
are eliminated by patterning certain aspects of the program after private
pension plans.

Benefits will be strictly determined by an individual’s

contributions.

Contributions to the program through the OASDI tax will

be maintained in a trust fund, which together with investment earnings,
will be sufficient to meet future liabilities.

Yet, Social Security

will still have many of the advantages only a public-administered pro
gram can provide— portability, uniformity, and a greater degree of "secu
rity" and permanence than is possible in a private insurance plan.

In

essence. Social Security will be a national compulsory savings plan, in
which taxes paid in during an individual's working years are returned to
the individual, together with interest, upon retirement.
The Social Security system is currently at a critical point in
its 40 year life.

The impending financial collapse and increased criticism

of the program could together spell its doom.

Before 1980, increased
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expenses will require either additional funds— from general revenues or
tax increases— or cuts in benefits.

While these decisions are being

formulated, a careful analysis of the entire system should be made with
attention to the long-term viability of the program.
Social Security has mushroomed into an enormous program affect
ing nearly all Americans and many aspects of the economy; and, as such,
no small changes will provide lasting solutions.
the system will no longer suffice.
in (1)
(2)

Patchwork repairs of

Comprehensive changes must be made

the financing of Social Security to make it self-supporting; and

assumptions and provisions of the program to make it responsive to

social changes.

Careful planning of these changes can assure the future

financial viability of Social Security and its continued support by the
American public.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS
Altraeyer, Arthur J. The Formative Years of Social Security.
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.

Madison,

Brown, J. Douglas. An American Philosophy of Social Security.
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Prince

Pechman, Joseph A . ; Aaron, Henry J.; and Taussig, Michael K. Social
Security— Perspectives for Reform. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1968.

JOURNAL AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES
Feldstein, Martin.
"Social Security, Tax Reform and Capital Accumu
lation." Tax Review. New York: Tax Foundation, February 1976,
pp. 5-8.
"Fresh Scare Over Social Security."
ruary 1976, pp. 68-70.

U.S. News & World Report.

16 Feb

Munnell, Alicia H. "The Future of Social Security." New England
Economic R e v i e w July-August 1976, pp. 11-26.
Myers, Robert J. "How Best to Keep Social Security Solvent."
Horizons. December 1976, pp. 45-50.

Business

Okner, Benjamin A. "The Social Security Payroll Tax: Some Alternatives
for Reform." The Journal of Finance 30 (May 1975): 567-84.
"Propping Up Social Security."

Business Week, 19 July 1976, pp. 34-43.

Social Security— Forty Years Later."
1975, pp. 1-4.

Social Security Bulletin. August

"What Happens to your Social Security Taxes?"
1 March 1976, p. 70.
"Will the Social Security Bubble Burst?"
1974, pp. 28-32,

U.S. News & World Report,

Nation's Business, November

95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. House. A Bill to Provide Equity in Social Security for
Individuals and Families. H.R. 3247, 95th Cong., 1st sess.,
1977.
________ . House. Representative Donald M. Fraser, speaking for the bill
to provide equity in Social Security for individuals and families.
94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 June 1976. Congressional Record, vol 122,
________ . House. Subcommittee on Retirement Income and Employment of the
Select Committee on Aging. Social Security Inequities Against
Women. Tish Sommers. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975.
________ . Senate. Special Committee on Aging. Women and Social Security:
Adapting to a New Era. Prepared by the Task Force on Women and
Social Security. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, B.C.: Govern
ment Printing Office, 1975.
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Social Security Admin
istration. Amendments Chart Booklet; OASDl. Washington, B.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972.
. Social Security Administration. Pocket History of Social
Security. Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.
________ . Social Security Administration. "Social Security Financing."
Editorial Research Reports. Mary Costello. Washington, B.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1972.
________ . Social Security Administration. Social Security Programs in
the United States. Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
1973.
________ . Social Security Administration.
for the Aged, Blind and Disabled.
Printing Office, 1975.

Supplemental Security Income
Washington, B.C.: Government

NEWSPAPERS
"Court Strikes Sex Discrimination from Social Security."
(Montana) Tribune, 3 March 1977, p. 1.

Great Falls

"Farewell to Ponzi? Change Must Come to the Social Security System."
Barron's, 3 January 1977, p. 7.
Porter, Sylvia. "Tracing Absentee Fathers."
Tribune, 8 April 1977, p. 18.

Great Falls (Montana)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

